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Abstract
We explore the structure of local ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (LO-
BIC) random Bayesian rules (RBRs). We show that under lower contour mono-
tonicity, almost all (with Lebesgue measure 1) LOBIC RBRs are local dominant
strategy incentive compatible (LDSIC). We also provide conditions on domains so
that unanimity implies lower contour monotonicity for almost all LOBIC RBRs.
We provide sufficient conditions on a domain so that almost all unanimous RBRs
on it (i) are Pareto optimal, (ii) are tops-only, and (iii) are only-topset. Finally,
we provide a wide range of applications of our results on the unrestricted, single-
peaked (on graphs), hybrid, multiple single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing,
multidimensional separable, lexicographic, and domains under partitioning. We
additionally establish the marginal decomposability property for both random social
choice functions and almost all RBRs on multi-dimensional domains, and thereby
generalize Breton and Sen (1999). Since OBIC implies LOBIC by definition, all
our results hold for OBIC RBRs.
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Bayesian incentive compatibility; (local) dominant strategy incentive compatibility
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1. INTRODUCTION
We consider social choice problems where a random social choice function (RSCF)
selects a probability distribution over a finite set of alternatives at every collection of
preferences of the agents in a society. It is incentive compatible (IC) if no agent can
increase the probability of any upper contour set by misreporting her preference. A
random Bayesian rule (RBR) consists of an RSCF and a prior belief of each agent
about the preferences of the others. We assume that the prior of an agent is “partially
correlated”: her belief about the preference of one agent may depend on that about
another agent, but it does not depend on her own preference. Ordinal Bayesian incentive
compatibility (OBIC) is the natural extension of the notion of IC for RBRs. This notion
is introduced in d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) and it captures the idea of Bayes-Nash
equilibrium in the context of incomplete information game. An RBR is OBIC if no agent
can increase the expected probability (with respect to her belief) of any upper contour
set by misreporting her preference.
Local DSIC (LDSIC) or local OBIC (LOBIC) are weaker versions of the correspond-
ing notions. As the name suggests, they apply to deviations/misreports to only “local”
preferences (the notion of which is fixed a priori). The importance of these local notions
is well-established in the literature: on one hand, they are useful in modeling behavioral
agents (see Carroll (2012)), on the other hand, on many domains they turn out to be
equivalent to their corresponding global versions and thereby used as a simpler way to
check whether a given RSCF is DSIC (see Carroll (2012), Kumar et al. (2020), Sato
(2013), Cho (2016), etc.).
The structure of DSIC RSCFs is well-explored in the literature. On the unrestricted
domain, they turn out to be random dictatorial, and on restricted domains such as single-
peaked or single-crossing or single-dipped, they are some versions of probabilistic
fixed ballot rules. However, to the best of our knowledge, the structure of LOBIC (or
OBIC) RBRs is not at all explored. Even for deterministic Bayesian rules (DBRs), not
much is known: on the unrestricted domain they are dictatorial for almost all priors
(with Lebesgue measure 1) (see Majumdar and Sen (2004) and Mishra (2016), and on
single-peaked domains, they are Pareto efficient (see Mishra (2016)).
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The main objective of this paper is to explore the structure of LOBIC RBRs on
different domains. The importance of Bayesian rules is well-established in the literature:
on one hand, they model real life situations where agents behave according to their beliefs,
on the other hand, they are significant weakening of the seemingly too demanding
requirement of DSIC that leads to dictatorship (or random dictatorships) unless the
domain is restricted. Moreover, randomization has long been recognized as a useful
device to achieve fairness in allocation problems. This comprises our motivation to study
RBRs.
We consider arbitrary notion of localness formulated by a graph over preferences.
We introduce the notion of lower contour monotonicity for an RBR and establish the
equivalence between LOBIC and the much stronger (and well-studied) notion LDSIC on
any domain for RBRs satisfying this property. The deterministic version of this result for
the special case of swap-local domains is proved in Mishra (2016).1 However, Mishra
(2016) considers “totally independent” priors: belief of an agent, apart from being
independent of her own preferences, is also independent over other agents’ preferences.
We provide conditions on swap-local domains so that under LOBIC, unanimity
implies lower contour monotonicity, and thereby making the equivalence of LDSIC and
LOBIC hold under unanimity. It turns out that the said equivalence does not hold on
most well-known restricted domains. Therefore, we provide conditions on arbitrary
graph-connected domains so that almost all unanimous and LOBIC RBRs on it (i) are
tops-only, (ii) are Pareto optimal, and (iii) are only-topset.2 Finally, we establish our
main equivalence result for weak preferences and provide a discussion explaining why
none of these results can be extended for fully correlated priors (that is, when the prior
of an agent depends on her own preference). It is worth emphasizing that all the existing
results for LOBIC DBRs (Majumdar and Sen (2004) and Mishra (2016)) follow from
our results. Furthermore, since every OBIC rule is LOBIC by definition, all our results
hold for OBIC rules in particular.
Majumdar and Sen (2004) introduce the notion of generic priors, the particularity
1A graph on a domain is swap-local if any two local preferences differ by a swap of consecutively
ranked alternatives.
2An RSCF is only-topset if it gives positive probabilities to only the alternatives that appear as a
top-ranked alternative in the domain.
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of which is that they have Lebesgue measure 1. It is well-known that a unanimous and
OBIC RBR with respect to a generic prior need not be random dictatorial, and therefore,
it was believed for long that the dictatorial result does not extend (almost surely) for
OBIC RBRs. However, it follows from our results that in fact it does, only thing is that
one needs to construct the right class of priors ensuring the Lebesgue measure to be 1.
We provide a wide range of applications of our results. We introduce the notion
of betweenness domains and establish the structure of almost all LOBIC RBRs on
these domains. Well-known restricted domains such as single-peaked on arbitrary
graphs, hybrid, multiple single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, and domains
under partitioning are important examples of betweenness domains. We introduce a
weaker version of lower contour monotonicity and obtain a characterization of almost all
unanimous and LOBIC RSCFs or DSCFs (depending on what is known in the literature
regarding the equivalence of LDSIC and DSIC) on these domains under that condition.
Furthermore, we explain with the help of an example how our results can be utilized
to construct the remaining RBRs (that is, the ones that do not satisfy lower contour
monotonicity).
Our consideration of arbitrary notion of localness allows us to provide the structure
of LOBIC RBRs on full separable multi-dimensional domains and lexicographically sep-
arable multi-dimensional domains when the marginal domains satisfy the betweenness
property, that is, when the marginal domains are unrestricted or single-peaked on graphs
or hybrid or multiple single-peaked or single-dipped or single-crossing. Additionally,
we prove an important property, called marginal decomposability, of almost all RBRs on
multidimensional separable domains. The deterministic version of it, namely decompos-
ability, is proved for DSCFs in Breton and Sen (1999) under DSIC. To the best of our
knowledge, this property is not established for RSCFs (even under DSIC), which now
follows from our general result about the same for RBRs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 introduce the
notions of domains, RSCFs, RBRs, and their relevant properties. Sections 5 and 6
present our results for graph-connected and swap-connected domains. Sections 7 and 9
present the applications of our results on betweenness and multi-dimensional domains.
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We present our result for weak preferences in Section 10. Finally, in Section 11 we
provide a discussion on DBRs and (fully) correlated priors.
2. PREFERENCES AND DOMAINS
We denote a finite set of alternatives by A and a finite set of n agents by N. A (strict)
preference over A is defined as a linear order on A.3 We deal with strict preferences
throughout the paper, except in Section 10 where we provide the definition of weak
preferences. The set of all preferences over A is denoted by P(A). A subset D of P(A)
is called a domain. Whenever it is clear from the context, we do not use brackets to
denote singleton sets.
The weak part of a preference P is denoted by R. Since P is strict, for any two
alternatives x and y, xRy implies either xPy or x = y. The kth ranked alternative in a
preference P is denoted by P(k). The topset τ(D) of a domain D is defined as the set
of alternatives ∪P∈DP(1). A domain D is regular if τ(D) = A. The upper contour set
U(x,P) of an alternative x at a preference P is defined as the set of alternatives that are
strictly preferred to x in P, that is,U(x,P) = {a ∈ A | aPx}. A setU is called an upper
contour set at P if it is an upper contour set of some alternative at P. The restriction of a
preference P to a subset B of alternatives is denoted by P|B, more formally, P|B ∈P(B)
such that for all a,b ∈ B, aP|Bb if and only if aPb.
Each agent i ∈ N has a domain Di (of admissible preferences). We assume that each
domain Di is endowed with some graph structure Gi = 〈Di,Ei〉. The graph Gi represents
the proximity relation between the preferences: an edge between two preferences implies
that they are close in some sense. For instance, suppose A= {a,b,c} and Di is the set
of all preferences over A. Suppose that two preferences are “close” if and only if they
differ by a swap of two alternatives. The graph Gi that represents this proximity relation
is given in Figure 1. The alternatives that swap between two preferences are mentioned
on the edge between the two.
We denote by GN a collection of graphs (Gi)i∈N . Whenever we use some term
involving the word “graph”, we mean it with respect to a collection GN . Two preferences
Pi and P
′
i of an agent i are graph-local if they form an edge in Gi, and a sequence of
3A linear order is a complete, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation.
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preferences (P1i , . . . ,P
t
i ) is a graph-local path if every two consecutive preferences in the
sequence are graph-local. A domain Di is graph-connected if there is a graph-local path
between any two preferences in it. We denote by DN the product set D1×·· ·×Dn of
individual domains. An element of DN is called a preference profile. All the domains
we consider in this paper are assumed to be graph-connected.
abc
{a,b}
bac
cab cba
{a,b}
acb bca
{b,c} {a,c}
{b,c}{a,c}
Figure 1
We use the following terminologies to ease the presentation: P ≡ xy · · · means
P(1) = x and P(2) = y; P≡ ·· ·xy · · · means x and y are consecutively ranked in P with
xPy; P≡ ·· ·x · · ·y · · · means x is ranked above y. When the set of alternatives is precisely
stated, say A= {a,b,c,d}, we write, for instance, P= abcd to mean P(1) = a, P(2) = b,
P(3) = c, and P(4) = d. We use similar notations without further explanations.
3. RANDOM SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND THEIR PROPERTIES
Let ∆A be the set of all probability distributions on A. A random social choice function
(RSCF) is a mapping ϕ : DN → ∆A. We denote the probability of an alternative x at
ϕ(PN) by ϕx(PN).
An RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A is unanimous if for all PN ∈ DN such that for all i ∈ N,
Pi(1) = x for some x ∈ A, we have ϕx(PN) = 1. An RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A is Pareto
optimal if for all PN ∈ DN and all x ∈ A such that there exists y ∈ A with yPix for all
i ∈ N, we have ϕx(PN) = 0. Clearly, Pareto optimality implies unanimity. An RSCF
ϕ : DN → ∆A is tops-only if for all PN ,P
′
N ∈ DN such that Pi(1) = P
′
i (1) for all i ∈ N,
we have ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P
′
N). An RSCF ϕ : D
n → ∆A is only-topset if for all PN ∈D
n, we
have ϕx(PN) = 0 for all x /∈ τ(D).
A probability distribution ν stochastically dominates another probability distribution
νˆ at a preference P, denoted by νPsdνˆ , if νU(x,Pi) ≥ νˆU(x,Pi) for all x ∈ A and νU(y,Pi) >
νˆU(y,Pi) for some y ∈ A. We write νR
sd νˆ to mean either νPsd νˆ or ν = νˆ . An RSCF
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ϕ : DN → ∆A is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) on a pair of preference
(Pi,P
′
i ) of an agent i ∈ N, if ϕ(Pi,P−i)R
sd
i ϕ(P
′
i ,P−i) for all P−i ∈ D−i. An RSCF is
graph-local dominant strategy incentive compatible (graph-LDSIC) if it is DSIC on
every pair of graph-local preferences of each agent, and it is called dominant strategy
incentive compatible (DSIC) if it is DSIC on every pair of preferences of each agent.
A set of alternatives B is a block in a pair of preferences (P,P′) if it is a minimal non-
empty set satisfying the following property: for all x∈ B and y /∈ B, P|{x,y}= P
′|{x,y}. For
instance, the blocks in the pair of preferences (abcde f g,bcadeg f ) are {a,b,c},{d},{e},
and { f ,g}. The lower contour set L(x,P) of an alternative x at a preference P is
L(x,P) = {a ∈ A | xPa}. A set L is a lower contour set at a preference P if it is a
lower contour set of some alternative at P. Lower contour monotonicity says that
whenever an agent i unilaterally deviates from Pi to a graph-local preference P
′
i , the
probability of each lower contour set at Pi restricted to any non-singleton block in (Pi,P
′
i )
will weakly increase. For instance, consider our earlier example Pi = abcde f g and
P′i = bcadeg f with non-singleton blocks {a,b,c} and { f ,g}. The lower contour sets at
Pi restricted to {a,b,c} are {c} and {b,c}, and that restricted to { f ,g} is {g}. Lower
contour monotonicity says that the probability of each of the sets {c}, {b,c}, and {g}
will weakly increase if agent i unilaterally deviates from Pi to P
′
i .
Definition 3.1. An RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A is called lower contour monotonic if for all
i ∈ N, all graph-local preferences Pi,P
′
i ∈Di, all non-singleton blocks B in (Pi,P
′
i ), and
all P−i ∈D−i, we have ϕL(Pi,P−i) ≥ ϕL(P
′
i ,P−i) for each lower contour set L of Pi|B.
4. RANDOM BAYESIAN RULES AND THEIR PROPERTIES
A prior µi of an agent i is a probability distribution over D−i which represents her belief
about the preferences of the others, and a prior profile µN := (µi)i∈N is a collection of
priors, one for each agent. A pair (ϕ ,µN) consisting of an RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A and a
prior profile µN is called a random Bayesian rule (RBR) on DN . When the RSCF ϕ is a
DSCF, then it is called a deterministic Bayesian rule (DBR).
The expected outcome with respect to the belief of an agent is called her interim
expected outcome. More formally, the interim expected outcome ϕ(Pi,µi) for an agent
i ∈ N at a preference Pi ∈ Di from an RBR (ϕ ,µN) on DN is defined as the following
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probability distribution on A: for all x ∈ A,
ϕx(Pi,µi) = ∑
P−i∈D−i
µi(P−i)ϕx(Pi,P−i).
Example 4.1. Let N = {1,2} and A = {a,b,c}. Consider the RBR (ϕ ,µN) given in
Table 1. Agent 1’s belief µ1 about agent 2’s preferences is given in the top row and
agent 2’s belief µ2 about agent 1’s preferences in the leftmost column of the table.
The rest of the table is self-explanatory. Consider the preference P1 = abc of agent 1.
Her interim expected outcome at this preference is calculated as follows: ϕa(P1,µ1) =
0.2×1+0.1×1+0.05×1+0.3×0.5+0.15×1+0.2×1= 0.85, ϕb(P1,µ1) = 0.2×
0+0.1×0+0.05×0+0.3×0.5+0.15×0+0.2×0= 0.15, and ϕc(P1,µ1) = 0.2×0+
0.1×0+0.05×0+0.3×0+0.15×0+0.2×0= 0. Similarly, for agent 2’s preference
P2 = bca, we have ϕb(P2,µ2) = 0.575, ϕc(P2,µ2) = 0.06, and ϕa(P2,µ2) = 0.365.
µ1 0.2 0.1 0.05 0.3 0.15 0.2
µ2 1 2 abc acb bac bca cba cab
0.25 abc (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0)
0.2 acb (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (0.7,0,0.3) (1,0,0) (1,0,0)
0.15 bac (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (1,0,0)
0.1 bca (0,1,0) (1,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
0.2 cba (1,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0.4,0.6) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
0.1 cab (1,0,0) (0,0.4,0.6) (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
Table 1
The notion of ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility (OBIC) captures the idea of
DSIC for an RBR by ensuring that no agent can improve her interim expected outcome
by misreporting her preference.
Definition 4.1. An RBR (ϕ ,µN) onDN is ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC)
on a pair of preferences (Pi,P
′
i ) of an agent i∈N if ϕµi(Pi)R
sd
i ϕµi(P
′
i ). An RBR (ϕ ,µN)
is graph-local ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible (graph-LOBIC) if it is OBIC
on every pair of graph-local preferences in the domain of each agent, and it is ordinal
Bayesian incentive compatible (OBIC) if it is OBIC on every pair of preferences in
the domain of each agent.
Note that OBIC is a weaker requirement than DSIC since if an RSCF ϕ is DSIC, then
(ϕ ,µN) is OBIC for all profiles of priors µN .
For ease of presentation, we use the following two terminologies in our paper. Given
a property defined for an RSCF, we say an RBR (ϕ ,µN) satisfies it, if ϕ satisfies
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the property. For instance, we say an RBR (ϕ ,µN) is unanimous, if the RSCF ϕ is
unanimous. We say some property holds for almost all RBRs with RSCF ϕ if there is a
set M of profiles of priors with (Lebesgue) measure 1 such that the said property holds
for each RBR (ϕ ,µN) where µN is in M . In other words, if a prior profile µN is chosen
randomly, then the RBR (ϕ ,µN) will satisfy the property with probability 1.
5. RESULTS ON GRAPH-CONNECTED DOMAINS
In this section, we explore the structure of graph-LOBIC Bayesian rules on graph-
connected domains. Since OBIC implies graph-LOBIC (by definition), all these results
hold for OBIC RBRs as well.
Recall the definition of a block given in Page 7. The block preservation property says
that if an agent unilaterally changes her preference to a graph-local preference, the total
probability of any block in the two preferences will remain unchanged.
Definition 5.1. An RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A satisfies the block preservation property if
for all i ∈ N, all graph-local preferences Pi,P
′
i ∈ Di of agent i, all blocks B in (Pi,P
′
i ),
and all P−i ∈D−i, we have ϕB(Pi,P−i) = ϕB(P
′
i ,P−i).
For two preferences P and P′, P△P′ = {x ∈ A |U(x,P) 6=U(x,P′)} denotes the set
of alternatives that change their relative ordering with some other alternative from P to
P′. Note that the block preservation property implies ϕx(Pi,P−i) = ϕx(P
′
i ,P−i) for all
x /∈ Pi△P
′
i as such an alternative forms a singleton block in (Pi,P
′
i ).
Proposition 5.1. Almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs satisfy the block preservation property.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix B.
5.1 EQUIVALENCE OF GRAPH-LOBIC AND GRAPH-LDSIC UNDER LOWER CON-
TOUR MONOTONICITY
The following theorem says that under lower contour monotonicity, almost all graph-
LOBIC RBRs are graph-LDSIC (on any graph-connected domain).
Theorem 5.1. If an RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A satisfies lower contour monotonicity, then
almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are graph-LDSIC.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.1.
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5.2 SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE EQUIVALENCE OF UNANIMITY AND PARETO
OPTIMALITY
Pareto optimality is much stronger than unanimity. However, under DSIC, these two
notions turn out to be equivalent for RSCFs on many domains such as the unrestricted,
single-peaked, single-dipped, single-crossing, etc. In this section, we show that similar
results hold with probability 1 if we replace DSIC by its weaker version OBIC. We
introduce the notion of upper contour preservation property for our result.
Definition 5.2. A domain D satisfies the upper contour preservation property if for
all x,y ∈ A and all P ∈D with xPy, there exists a graph-local path from P to a preference
Pˆ ∈D with Pˆ(1) = x such thatU(P,y) =U(Pˆ,y).
Our next theorem says that if a domain satisfies the upper contour preservation
property then almost all unanimous and graph-LOBIC RBRs on it will be Pareto optimal.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose Di satisfies the upper contour preservation property for all i ∈ N.
If an RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A satisfies unanimity, then almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs with
RSCF ϕ are Pareto optimal.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.2.
5.3 RELATION BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND TOPS-ONLYNESS
We use the notion of path-richness in our result. A domain satisfies the path-richness
property if for every two preferences P and P′ having the same top-ranked alternative,
say x, the following happens: (i) if P and P′ are not graph-local then there is graph-local
path from P to P′ such that x appears as the top-ranked alternative in each preference
in the path, and (ii) if P and P′ are graph-local, then from any preference Pˆ there is a
path to some preference P¯ with x as the top-ranked alternative such that for any two alter-
natives a,b that change their relative ranking from P to P′ and for any two consecutive
preferences in the path, there is a common upper contour set of the preferences such that
exactly one of a and b belongs to it. For an illustration of Part (ii) of the path-richness
property, suppose A= {a,b,c,d}, P= abcd and P′ = adcb, and assume that P and P′
are graph-local. Consider a preference Pˆ = dbca. Path-richness requires that a path
of the following type must be present in the domain: (dbca,dbac,dabc,adbc). To see
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that this path satisfies (ii), consider two alternatives that change their relative ordering
from P to P′, say b and c. Note that the upper contour set {d,b} in P1 and P2 contains
b but not c, the upper contour set {d,b,a} in P2 and P3 contains b but not c, and so on.
Path-richness requires that such a path must exist for every preference Pˆ in the domain.
Definition 5.3. A domain D satisfies the path-richness property if for all preferences
P,P′ ∈D such that P(1) = P′(1),
(i) if P and P′ are not graph-local, then there is a graph-local path (P1 = P, . . . ,Pt =
P′) such that Pl(1) = P(1) for all l = 1, . . . , t, and
(ii) if P and P′ are graph-local, then for each preference Pˆ ∈D , there exists a graph-
local path (P1 = Pˆ, . . . ,Pt) with Pt(1) = P(1) such that for all l < t and all
distinct y,z ∈ P△P′, there is a common upper contour setU of Pl and P¯l+1 such
that exactly one of y and z is contained inU .
Our next theorem says that the path-richness property of a domain ensures that almost
all unanimous and graph-LOBIC RBRs on it are tops-only.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose D satisfies the path-richness property. If an RSCF ϕ : Dn→ ∆A
satisfies unanimity, then almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are tops-only.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.3.
Remark 5.1. Lower contour monotonicity can be weakened in a straightforward way
under tops-onlyness. Let us say that an RSCF satisfies top lower contour monotonicity
if it satisfies lower contour monotonicity only over (unilateral) deviations to graph-
local preferences where the top-ranked alternative is changed. Thus, top lower contour
monotonicity does not impose any restriction for graph-local preferences P and P′
with τ(P) = τ(P′). Clearly, under tops-onlyness, lower contour monotonicity will be
automatically guaranteed in all other cases, and hence, top lower contour monotonicity
will be equivalent to lower contour monotonicity. Since under graph-LOBIC, unanimity
implies tops-onlyness on a large class of domains, this simple observation is of great
help for practical applications.
5.4 RELATION BETWEEN TOPS-ONLYNESS AND ONLY-TOPSETNESS
We use the notion of top-connectedness in our result. Two alternatives a and b are top-
connected in a domain D if there exist graph-local preferences P,P′ ∈D with P≡ xy · · ·
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and P′ ≡ yx · · · such that P|A\{x,y} = P
′|A\{x,y}.
Definition 5.4. A domain D is called top-connected if for all x, x¯ ∈ τ(D) there exists a
sequence (x1 = x,x2, . . . ,xt = x¯) of alternatives such that xl and xl+1 are top-connected
for all l < t.
Our next result says that almost all unanimous and tops-only graph-LOBIC RBRs on
a top-connected domain are only-topset.
Theorem 5.4. Suppose D is top-connected. If an RSCF ϕ : Dn→∆A satisfies unanimity
and tops-onlyness, then almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are only-topset.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.4.
6. THE CASE OF SWAP-CONNECTED DOMAINS
In this section, we consider graphs where two preferences are local if and only if they
differ by a swap of two consecutively ranked alternatives. Formally, two preferences P
and P′ are swap-local if P△P′ = {x,y} for some x,y∈ A. For two swap-local preferences
P and P′, we say x overtakes y from P to P′ if yPx and xP′y. A domain Di is swap-
connected if there is a swap-local path between any two preferences in it. We use terms
like swap-LOBIC, swap-LDSIC, etc. (instead of graph-LOBIC, graph-LDSIC, etc.) to
emphasize the fact that the graph is based on the swap-local structure.
When graphs are swap-connected, lower contour monotonicity boils down to the
following condition called elementary monotonicity. An RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A is called
elementary monotonic if for every i ∈ N, all swap-local preferences Pi,P
′
i ∈Di of agent
i, and all P−i ∈ D−i, x overtakes some alternative from Pi to P
′
i implies ϕx(Pi,P−i) ≤
ϕx(P
′
i ,P−i).
Under swap-connectedness, Condition (ii) of the path-richness property (Definition
5.3) simplifies to the following condition: if there are two swap-local preferences having
the same top-ranked alternative, say x, where two alternatives, say y and z, are swapped,
then from every preference in the domain there must be a swap-local path to some
preference with x as the top-ranked alternative such that the relative ranking of y and z
remains the same along the path.
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6.1 EQUIVALENCE OF SWAP-LDSIC AND WEAK ELEMENTARY MONOTONICITY
UNDER TOPS-ONLYNESS
Weak elementary monotonicity (Mishra (2016)) is a restricted version of elementary
monotonicity where the latter is required to be satisfied only for a particular type of
profiles where all the agents agree on the ranking of alternatives from rank three onward.
Definition 6.1. An RSCF ϕ : Dn→ ∆A satisfies weak elementary monotonicity if for
all i ∈ N, and all (Pi,P−i) and (P
′
i ,P−i) such that Pi(k) = P
′
i (k) = Pj(k) for all j ∈ N \ i
and all k > 2, we have ϕPi(1)(Pi,P−i) ≥ ϕPi(1)(P
′
i ,P−i).
Our next result says that under tops-onlyness, almost all weak elementary monotonic
and swap-LOBIC RBRs are swap-LDSIC.
Theorem 6.1. If an RSCF ϕ : Dn → ∆A satisfies tops-onlyness, then almost all weak
elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are swap-LDSIC.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.5.
The following corollary follows from Theorem 5.3 and Theorem 6.1.
Corollary 6.1. Suppose D satisfies the path-richness property. If an RSCF ϕ : Dn→∆A
satisfies unanimity, then almost all weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC RBRs with
RSCF ϕ are swap-LDSIC.
6.2 EQUIVALENCE OF SWAP-LOBIC AND SWAP-LDSIC UNDER PARETO OPTI-
MALITY AND TOPS-ONLYNESS
A domain satisfies the top-swap richness property if for all distinct x,y,z∈A, whenever
there are two swap-local preferences P≡ xyz · · · and P′ ≡ yxz · · · in D , the swap-local
path (P,xzy · · · ,zxy · · · ,zyx · · · ,yzx · · · ,P′) is in D . Our next theorem provides a suffi-
cient condition on a domain for the equivalence of swap-LOBIC and swap-LDSIC under
Pareto optimality and tops-onlyness.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose |A| ≥ 3 and D satisfies the top-swap richness property. If
an RSCF ϕ : Dn → ∆A satisfies Pareto optimality and tops-onlyness, then almost all
swap-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are swap-LDSIC.
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The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.6.
In Section 5.2 and Section 5.3, we provide conditions on a domain so that unanimity
implies Pareto optimality, and unanimity implies tops-onlyness for almost all swap-
LOBIC RBRs. We will improve Theorem 6.2 under unanimity as corollaries of those
results.
It is worth mentioning that many restricted domains of practical importance, such as
the single-peaked, hybrid, multiple single-peaked, single-crossing, single-dipped, etc.,
do not satisfy the top-swap richness property.4
7. APPLICATIONS ON DOMAINS SATISFYING THE BETWEENNESS PROPERTY
A betweenness relation β maps every pair of distinct alternatives (x,y) to a subset of
alternatives β (x,y) including x and y. We only consider betweenness relations β that
are rational: for every x ∈ A, there is a preference P with P(1) = x such that for all
y,z ∈ A, y ∈ β (x,z) implies yRz. Such a preference P is said to respect the betweenness
relation β . A domain D respects a betweenness relation β if it contains all preferences
respecting β . We denote such a domain by D(β ). For a collection of betweenness
relations B = {β1, . . . ,βr}, we denote the domain ∪
r
l=1D(βl) by D(B).
A pair of alternatives (x,y) is adjacent in β if β (x,y) = {x,y}. A betweenness
relation β is weakly consistent if for all x, x¯ ∈ A, there is a sequence (x1 = x, . . . ,xt = x¯)
of adjacent alternatives in β (x, x¯) such that for all l < k, we have β (xl+1, x¯) ⊆ β (xl , x¯).
A betweenness relation β is strongly consistent if for all x, x¯ ∈ A, there is a sequence
(x1 = x, . . . ,xt = x¯) of adjacent alternatives in β (x, x¯) such that for all l < t and all w ∈
β (xl , x¯), we have β (xl+1,w)⊆ β (xl , x¯). A collection B = {β1, . . . ,βr} or a betweenness
domain D(B) is strongly/weakly consistent if βl is strongly/weakly consistent for all
l = 1, . . . ,r.
Two betweenness relations β and β ′ are swap-local if for every x ∈ A, there are
P ∈ D(β ) and P′ ∈ D(β ′) such that P(1) = P′(1) and P and P′ are swap-local. A
collection B of betweenness relations is called swap-connected if for all β ,β ′ ∈ B,
there is a sequence (β 1 = β , . . . ,β t = β ′) in B such that β l and β l+1 are swap-local for
all l < t.
4In Section 7, we present formal definitions of these restricted domains.
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We now define the local structure on a betweenness domain D(B) in a natural
way. A preference P′ is graph-local to another preference P if there is no preference
P′′ ∈ D(B) \{P,P′} that is “more similar” to P than P′ is to P, that is, there is no P′′
such that for all x,y ∈ A, P|{x,y} = P
′|{x,y} implies P|{x,y} = P
′′|{x,y}. Our next corollary
follows from Theorem 5.3.
Corollary 7.1. Let B be a collection of strongly consistent and swap-connected be-
tweenness relations. Then, almost all unanimous and graph-LOBIC RBRs on D(B) are
tops-only.
The proof of this corollary is relegated to Appendix C.7.
A domain is called graph deterministic local-global equivalent (graph-DLGE) if every
graph-LDSIC DSCF on it is DSIC.
Theorem 7.1. Let B be a collection of weakly consistent and swap-connected between-
ness relations. Then, D(B) is a graph-DLGE domain.
The proof of this corollary is relegated to Appendix C.8.
In what follows, we apply our results to explore the structure of LOBIC RBRs on
well-known betweenness domains.
7.1 THE UNRESTRICTED DOMAIN
The domain P(A) containing all preferences over A is called the unrestricted domain
(over A). Since, the unrestricted domain satisfies both the upper contour preservation
property and the path-richness property, it follows from Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 that
unanimity implies both Pareto optimality and tops-only for almost all swap-LOBIC
RBRs. Combining all these observations with Theorem 6.2 we derive the following
proposition.
Proposition 7.1. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs are swap-LDSIC.
Gibbard (1977) shows that every unanimous and DSIC RSCF on the unrestricted
domain is random dictatorial. Let us call a domain swap random local-global equivalent
(swap-RLGE) if every swap-LDSIC RSCF on it is DSIC. It follows from Cho (2016)
that the unrestricted domain is swap-RLGE. Since every OBIC RBR is swap-LOBIC by
definition, it follows from Proposition 7.1 that the same result as Gibbard (1977) holds
(with probability 1) if we replace DSIC with the much weaker notion OBIC.
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Corollary 7.2. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the unrestricted domain
over at least three alternatives are random dictatorial.
7.2 SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS ON GRAPHS
Peters et al. (2019) introduce the notion of single-peaked domains on graphs and char-
acterize all unanimous and DSIC RSCFs on these domains. We assume that the set of
alternatives is endowed with an (undirected) graph G = 〈A,E〉. For x, x¯ ∈ A with x 6= x¯, a
path (x1 = x, . . . ,xt = x¯) from x to x¯ in G is a sequence of distinct alternatives such that
{xi,xi+1} ∈ E for all i= 1, . . . , t−1. If it is clear which path is meant, we also denote
it by [x, x¯]. We assume that G is connected, that is, there is a path from x to x¯ for all
distinct x, x¯ ∈ A. If this path is unique for all x, x¯ ∈ A, then G is called a tree. A spanning
tree of G is a tree T = 〈A,ET 〉 where ET ⊆ E. In other words, spanning tree of G is a
tree that can be obtained by deleting some edges of G .
Definition 7.1. A preference P is single-peaked on G if there is a spanning tree T of G
such that for all distinct x,y ∈ A with P(1) 6= y, x ∈ [P(1),y] =⇒ xPy, where [P(1),y]
is the path from P(1) to y in T . A domain is called single-peaked on G if it contains all
single-peaked preferences on G .
It follows from the definition that a single-peaked domain DT on a tree T can be
represented as a betweenness domain D(βT ) where βT is defined as follows: βT (x,y) =
[x,y]. Single-peaked domains on graphs are well-known for the cases when the graph G
is a line or a tree.5 When the graph G is a line, then the corresponding domain is known
in the literature as the single-peaked domain.6
In what follows, we argue that a single-peaked domain on a graph satisfies the upper
contour preservation property. Since a single-peaked domain on a graph is a union
of single-peaked domains on trees, it is enough to show that a single-peaked domain
on a tree satisfies the upper contour preservation property. Consider a single-peaked
domain DT on a tree T . Let P be a preference with xPy for some x,y ∈ A. Suppose
P(1) = a. Consider the path [a,x] in T . Since xPy, it must be that y /∈ [a,x]. Suppose
[a,x] = (x1 = a, . . . ,xk = x). By the definition of single-peaked domain on a tree, one
5A tree is called a line if it has exactly two nodes with degree one (such nodes are called leafs).
6A line graph can be represented by a linear order ≺ over the alternatives in an obvious manner: if the
edges in a line graph are {(a1,a2), . . . , (am−1,am)}, then one can take the linear order ≺ as a1 ≺ ·· · ≺ am.
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can go from P to a preference with x2 at the top through a swap-local path maintaining
the upper contour set of y. Continuing in this manner, one can go to a preference with x
at the top maintaining the upper contour set of y. This concludes that DT satisfies the
upper contour preservation property, and hence, we obtain the following corollary from
Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 7.3. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the single-peaked
domain on a graph are Pareto optimal.
We now argue that the betweenness relation βT is strongly consistent. To see that βT
is strongly consistent consider two alternatives x and x¯, and consider the unique path
[x, x¯] between them in T . Let [x, x¯] = (x1 = x, . . . ,xt = x¯). By the definition of βT , the
path [x, x¯] lies in (in fact, is equal to) βT (x, x¯). Consider xl ∈ βT (x, x¯) and w ∈ βT (xl , x¯).
Since both w and xl+1 lie on the path [xl , x¯], it follows that [xl+1,w] ⊆ [xl , x¯], and hence
βT (xl+1,w) ⊆ βT (xl , x¯). This proves that βT is the strongly consistent (and hence is
also weakly consistent). Since a betweenness relation that generates a single-peaked
domain on a tree is strongly consistent, it follows from the definition of a single-peaked
domain on a graph that the betweenness relation that generates such a domain also
satisfies the property. It is shown in Peters et al. (2019) (see Lemma A.1 for details) that
for all x ∈ A, the (sub)domain of DG containing all preferences with x as the top-ranked
alternative is swap-connected, which implies that the betweenness relations generated by
the spanning trees of a graph are swap-connected. Therefore, it follows from Corollary
7.1 that almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the single-peaked domain on a
graph are tops-only. Consequently, we obtain the following corollary from Corollary 6.1.
Corollary 7.4. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-peaked domain on a graph are swap-LDSIC.
It follows from Theorem 7.1 that the single-peaked domain on a graph is swap-DLGE.
It is shown in Peters et al. (2019) that a DSCF on the single-peaked domain on a graph is
unanimous and DSIC if and only if it is a monotonic collection of parameters based rule
(see Theorem 5.5 in Peters et al. (2019) for details). Although Peters et al. (2019) provide
the result for RSCFs, we cannot apply it as it is not known whether the single-peaked
domain on a graph is RLGE or not. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary from
Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 7.1.
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Corollary 7.5. Almost all unanimous, weak elementary monotonic, and swap-LOBIC
DBRs on the single-peaked domain on a graph are monotonic collection of parameters
based rules.
Cho (2016) shows that the single-peaked domain is swap-RLGE. Moreover, Peters
et al. (2014) show that every unanimous and DSIC RSCF on the single-peaked domain is
a probabilistic fixed ballot rule (PFBR). We obtain the following corollary by combining
these results with Corollary 7.4.
Corollary 7.6. Almost all unanimous, weak elementary monotonic, and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-peaked domain are PFBRs.
In what follows, we provide a discussion on the structure of unanimous and swap-
LOBIC RBRs on the single-peaked domain that do not satisfy weak elementary mono-
tonicity. The structure of such RBRs depends on the specific prior profile. In the
following example, we present an RSCF for three agents that is unanimous and OBIC
with respect to any independent prior profile (µ1,µ2,µ3) where µ2(abc) ≥
1
6
.7 By
Corollary 7.1, we know that such an RSCF will be tops-only. In Table 2, the preferences
in rows and columns belong to agents 1 and 2, respectively, and the preferences written
at the top-left corner of any table belong to agent 3. Note that agent 3 is the dictator for
this RSCF except when she has the preference abc. When she has the preference abc,
the rule violates weak elementary monotonicity over the profiles (abc,bac,abc) and
(bac,bac,abc). Note that except from such violations, the rule behaves like a PFBR.
abc abc bac bca cba
abc (1,0,0) (0.4,0.6,0) (0.4,0.6,0) (0.4,0.6,0)
bac (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0)
bca (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0)
cba (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0) (0.5,0.5,0)
bac abc bac bca cba
abc (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
bac (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
bca (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
cba (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
bca abc bac bca cba
abc (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
bac (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
bca (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
cba (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0) (0,1,0)
cba abc bac bca cba
abc (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
bac (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
bca (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
cba (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1) (0,0,1)
Table 2
7The rule is OBIC for dependent priors if: 5µ1(abc,abc) ≥ µ1(bac,abc) + µ1(bca,abc) +
µ1(cba,abc), where the first and the second preference in µ1 denote the preferences of agents 2 and 3,
respectively.
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7.3 HYBRID DOMAINS
Chatterji et al. (2020) introduce the notion of hybrid domains and discuss its importance.
These domains satisfy single-peaked property only over a subset of alternatives. Let us
assume that A= {1, . . . ,m}. Throughout this subsection, we assume that two alternatives
k and k with k < k are arbitrary but fixed.
Definition 7.2. A preference P is called (k,k)-hybrid if the following two conditions are
satisfied:
(i) For all r,s ∈ A such that either r,s ∈ [1,k] or r,s ∈ [k,m],
[
r< s< P(1) or P(1)<
s< r
]
⇒ [ sPr ].
(ii)
[
P(1) ∈ [1,k]
]
⇒
[
kPr for all r ∈ (k,k]
]
and
[
P(1) ∈ [k,m]
]
⇒
[
kPs for all s ∈ [k,k)
]
.8
A domain is (k,k)-hybrid if it contains all (k,k)-hybrid preferences. The betweenness
relation β that generates a (k,k)-hybrid domain is as follows: if x < y then β (x,y) =
{x,y} ∪
(
(x,y) \ (k,k)
)
and if y < x then β (x,y) = {x,y} ∪
(
(y,x) \ (k,k)
)
. In other
words, an alternative other than x and y lies between x and y if and only if it lies in the
interval [x,y] or [y,x] but not in the interval (k,k).
In what follows, we argue that a hybrid domain satisfies the upper contour preservation
property. Consider a preference P in a (k,k)-hybrid domain. Suppose xPy for some
x,y ∈ A. Assume without loss of generality that x< a. Let P(1) = a and letU(x,P)∩
[x,a] = {x1 = a, . . . ,xk = x} where x1Px2P · · ·Pxk. Note that by the definition of the
(k,k)-hybrid domain, from P one can go to a preference with x2 at the top though a
swap-local path by maintaining the upper contour set of y. Therefore, by repeated
application of this fact, one can go to a preference with x at the top by maintaining the
upper contour set of y. This shows that a hybrid domain satisfies the upper contour
preservation property. Therefore, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.2.
Corollary 7.7. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the (k,k)-hybrid do-
main are Pareto optimal.
8For two alternatives x and y, by (x,y]we denote the alternatives z such that x< z≤ y. The interpretation
of the notation [x,y) is similar.
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Using similar logic as we have used in the case of a single-peaked domain on a
tree, it follows that the betweenness relation that generates a hybrid domain is strongly
consistent. Therefore, Corollary 7.1 implies that almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the (k,k)-hybrid domain are tops-only. Therefore, by Corollary 6.1, we obtain
the following corollary.
Corollary 7.8. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the (k,k)-hybrid domain are swap-LDSIC.
Chatterji et al. (2020) show that every unanimous and DSIC RSCF on the hybrid
domain is a (k,k)-restricted probabilistic fixed ballot rule ((k,k)-RPFBR). Since the
hybrid domain is swap-RLGE (see Chatterji et al. (2020) for details), Corollary 7.8
implies the following result.
Corollary 7.9. Almost all unanimous, weak elementary monotonic, and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the (k,k)-hybrid domain are (k,k)-RPFBRs.
7.4 MULTIPLE SINGLE-PEAKED DOMAINS
The notion of multiple single-peaked domains is introduced in Reffgen (2015). As
the name suggests, these domains are union of several single-peaked domains. It is
worth mentioning that these domains are different from hybrid domains–neither of them
contains the other. For ease of presentation, we denote a single-peaked domain with
respect to a prior ordering ≺ over A by D≺.
Definition 7.3. Let Ω ⊆P(A) be a swap-connected collection of prior orderings over
A. A domain D is called multiple single-peaked with respect to Ω if D = ∪≺∈ΩD≺.
Since the prior orders in a multiple single-peaked domain are assumed to be swap-
connected, it follows that preferences with the same top-ranked alternative are swap-
connected. This implies that the collection B of betweenness relations that generate a
multiple single-peaked domain is swap-connected. Using similar logic as we have used
in the case of a single-peaked domain on a tree, it follows that multiple single-peaked
domains are both weakly and strongly consistent betweenness domains. Therefore,
Corollary 7.1 implies that almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the multiple
single-peaked domain are tops-only. Using similar argument as we have used in the
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case of a single-peaked domain on a tree, it follows that multiple single-peaked domains
satisfy the upper contour preservation property. In view of these observations, we obtain
the following corollaries from Theorem 5.2 and Corollary 6.1.
Corollary 7.10. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the multiple single-
peaked domain are Pareto optimal.
Corollary 7.11. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the multiple single-peaked domain are swap-LDSIC.
Let us assume without loss of generality that Ω contains the integer ordering < over
A = {1, . . . ,m}. For a class of prior ordering Ω over A, the left cut-off k is defined as
the maximum (with respect to <) alternative with the property that 1≺ 2≺ ·· · ≺ k ≺ x
for all x /∈ {1, . . . ,k} and all ≺∈ Ω. Similarly, define the right cut-off as the minimum
alternative k such that x ≺ k ≺ ·· · ≺ m− 1 ≺ m for all x /∈ {k, . . . ,m} and all ≺∈ Ω.
Reffgen (2015) shows that a DSCF is unanimous and DSIC on a multiple single-peaked
domain with left cut-off k and right cut-off k if and only if it is a (k,k)-partly dictatorial
generalized median voter scheme ((k,k)-PDGMVS). Moreover, by Theorem 7.1, a
multiple single-peaked domain is a swap-DLGE domain. Combining all these results
with Corollary 7.11, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.12. Let Ω be a class of swap-connected prior orderings over A with the
left cut-off k and the right cut-off k. Then, almost all unanimous and weak elementary
monotonic swap-LOBIC DBRs on the multiple single-peaked domain with respect to Ω
are (k,k)-PDGMVSs.
7.5 DOMAINS UNDER PARTITIONING
The notion of domains under partitioning is introduced in Mishra and Roy (2012). Such
domains arise when a group of objects are to be partitioned based on the preferences of
the agents over different partitions.
Let X be a finite set of objects and let A be the set of all partitions of X .9 For instance,
if X = {x,y,z}, then elements of A are
{
{x},{y},{z}
}
,
{
{x},{y,z}
}
,
{
{y},{x,z}
}
,
{
{z},{x,y}
}
, and
{
{x,y,z}
}
. We say that two objects are together in a partition if they
9A partition of a set is a set of subsets of that set that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
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are contained in a common element (subset of X) of the partition. For instance, objects
x and y are together in the partition
{
{z},{x,y}
}
. If two objects are not together in a
partition, we say they are separated. For three distinct partitions X1,X2,X3 ∈ A, we say
X2 lies between X1 and X3 if for every two objects x and y, x and y are together in both
X1 and X3 implies they are also together in X2, and x and y are separate in both X1 and X3
implies they are also separate in X2. For instance, any of the partitions
{
{x},{y,z}
}
or
{
{y},{x,z}
}
or
{
{z},{x,y}
}
lies between
{
{x},{y},{z}
}
and
{
{x,y,z}
}
. This follows
from the fact that no two objects are together (or separated) in both
{
{x},{y},{z}
}
and
{
{x,y,z}
}
, so the betweenness condition is vacuously satisfied. For another instance,
consider the partitions
{
{x,y},{z}
}
and
{
{x,z},{y}
}
. The only partition that lies
between these two partitions is
{
{x},{y},{z}
}
. To see this, note that y are z are separate
in both the partitions (and no two objects are together in both), and
{
{x},{y},{z}
}
is
the only partition (other than the two) in which y and z are separated.
Definition 7.4. A domain D is intermediate if for all P ∈D and every two partitions
X1,X2 ∈ A, X1 lies between P(1) and X2 implies X1PX2.
By definition, intermediate domains are betweenness domains. In Table 3, we present
three preferences in an intermediate domain with three objects that have different struc-
ture of the top-ranked partition. Note that the betweenness relation does not specify the
ordering of {{a,b},{c}}, {{{a,c},{b}}}, and {{a},{b,c}} when {{a},{b},{c}} is the
top-ranked partition. Therefore, there are six preferences with {{a},{b},{c}} as the
top-ranked partition, P1 is one of them. It is worth noting that an intermediate domain
is not swap-connected. For instance, the preferences P2 and P3 are graph-local but not
swap-local.
P1 P2 P3
{{a},{b},{c}} {{a,b},{c}} {{a,b,c}}
{{a,b},{c}} {{a,b,c}} {{a,b},{c}}
{{a,c},{b}} {{a},{b},{c}} {{a,c},{b}}
{{a},{b,c}} {{a,c},{b}} {{a},{b,c}}
{{a,b,c}} {{a},{b,c}} {{a},{b},{c}}
Table 3
Proposition 7.2. The intermediate domain is strongly consistent.
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The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix C.9.
By Corollary 7.1 and Proposition 7.2, it follows that almost all unanimous and
DSIC RBRs on the intermediate domain are tops-only. This is a major step towards
characterizing almost all unanimous and DSIC RBRs on the intermediate domain. It is
worth mentioning that the structure of unanimous and DSIC RSCFs are yet not explored
on the intermediate domain and it follows from Corollary 7.1 that every such rule is
tops-only.
It is shown in Mishra and Roy (2012) that a DSCF is unanimous and DSIC on the
intermediate domain if and only if it is a meet aggregator. Moreover, by Theorem 7.1
and Proposition 7.2, every intermediate domain is graph-DLGE. Combining these results
with Remark 5.1, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 7.13. Almost all top lower contour monotonic graph-LOBIC DBRs on the
intermediate domain are meet aggregators.
8. NON-REGULAR DOMAINS
In this section, we consider two important non-regular domains, namely single-dipped
and single-crossing domains. Let the alternatives be A= {1, . . . ,m}.
8.1 SINGLE-DIPPED DOMAINS
A preference is single-dipped if there is a “dip” (the worst alternative) of it so that as one
moves farther away from it, preference increases. These domains arise in the context of
locating a “public bad” (such as garbage dump, nuclear plant, wind mill, etc.).
Definition 8.1. A preference P is single-dipped if it has a unique minimal element
d(P), the dip of P, such that for all x,y ∈ A, [d(P) ≤ x< y or y< x≤ d(P)]⇒ yPx. A
domain is single-dipped if it contains all single-dipped preferences.
Since the single-dipped domain is swap-connected, it satisfies top-connectedness.
Therefore, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.4.
Corollary 8.1. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the single-dipped
domain are only-topset.
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Note that the topset of a single-dipped domain consists of the alternatives 1 and m.
Therefore, by Corollary 8.1, to analyze the structure of unanimous and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on a single-dipped domain, we can assume that there are only two alternatives.
Thus, a single-dipped domain becomes the unrestricted domain over two alternatives,
and hence we obtain the following corollaries from Theorem 5.3 and Corollary 6.1.
Corollary 8.2. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-dipped domain are tops-only.
Corollary 8.3. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-dipped domain are swap-LDSIC.
It is shown in Peters et al. (2017) that an RSCF on the single-dipped domain is
unanimous and DSIC if and only if it is a random committee rule. We obtain the
following corollary by combining this result with Corollary 8.3 and the fact that every
swap-LDSIC RSCF on the single-dipped domain is DSIC (see Cho (2016) for details).
Corollary 8.4. Almost all unanimous, weak elementary monotonic, and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-dipped domain are random committee rules.
8.2 SINGLE-CROSSING DOMAINS
A domain is single-crossing if its preferences can be ordered in a way so that no two
alternatives change their relative ranking more than once along that ordering. Such
domains are used in models of income taxation and redistribution, local public goods
and stratification, and coalition formation (see Saporiti (2009) for details).
Definition 8.2. A domain D is single-crossing if there is an ordering ⊳ over D such
that for all x,y ∈ A and all P,P′ ∈D , [x< y,P⊳P′, and yPx] =⇒ yP′x.
Since the single-crossing domain is swap-connected, it satisfies top-connectedness.
Therefore, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 5.4.
Corollary 8.5. Almost all unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on the single-crossing
domain are only-topset.
By Corollary 8.5, to analyze the structure of unanimous and swap-LOBIC RBRs on a
single-crossing domain, we can restrict a single-crossing domain to its topset. To see that
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a single-crossing domain satisfies the path-richness property, consider an alternative a
and suppose that there are two swap-local preferences P≡ a · · ·xy · · · and P′ ≡ a · · ·yx · · · .
Since P and P′ are swap-local, they must be consecutive in the ordering ⊳. Assume
without loss of generality that P⊳P′. This means xPˆy for all Pˆ with Pˆ⊳P and yP¯x for all
P¯ with P′ ⊳ Pˆ. Consider any preference P˜. If xP˜y, then P˜⊳P, and hence from P˜ one can
go to the preference P following the path given by ⊳ maintaining the relative ordering
between x and y. On the other hand, if yP˜x, then one can go from P˜ to the preference
P′ following the path given by ⊳. This shows that a single-crossing domain satisfies the
path-richness property, and hence we obtain the following corollaries from Theorem 5.3
and Corollary 6.1.
Corollary 8.6. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-crossing domain are tops-only.
Corollary 8.7. Almost all unanimous and weak elementary monotonic swap-LOBIC
RBRs on the single-crossing domain are swap-LDSIC.
Roy and Sadhukhan (2019) show that an RSCF on the single-crossing domain is
unanimous and DSIC if and only if it is a tops-restricted probabilistic fixed ballot rules
(TPFBRs). Moreover, Cho (2016) shows that every swap-LDSIC RSCF on the single-
crossing domain is DSIC. Combining these results with Corollary 8.7, we obtain the
following corollary.
Corollary 8.8. Almost all unanimous, weak elementary monotonic, and swap-LOBIC
RBRs on any single-crossing domain are TPFBRs.
9. APPLICATIONS ON MULTI-DIMENSIONAL SEPARABLE DOMAINS
Multi-dimensional separable domains comprise the main application of our general
model. We assume that the alternative set can be decomposed as a Cartesian product,
i.e., A = A1×·· ·×Ak, where 1, . . . ,k are the components/dimensions with k ≥ 2, and
for each component l ∈ K, the component set Al contains at least two elements. Thus, an
alternative x is a vector of k elements, and hence we denote it (x1, . . . ,xk). For l ∈ K, we
denote by A−l the set A1×·· ·×Al−1×Al+1×·· ·×Ak and by x−l an element of A−l .
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A preference P ∈P(A) is separable if there exists a (unique) marginal preference
Pl for each l ∈ K such that for all x,y ∈ A, we have [xlPlyl for some l ∈ K and x−l =
y−l ]⇒ [xPy]. A domain is called separable if each preference in it is separable.
9.1 LEXICOGRAPHICALLY SEPARABLE DOMAINS
A preference P is lexicographically separable if there exists a (unique) component
order P0 ∈P(K) and a (unique) marginal preference P j ∈P(A j) for each j ∈ K such
that for all x,y∈ A, we have
[
xlPlyl for some l ∈K and x j = y j for all jP0l
]
⇒ [xPy]. A
lexicographically separable preference P can be uniquely represented by a (k+ 1)-tuple
consisting of a lexicographic order P0 over the components and marginal preferences
P1, . . . ,Pk. We write P= (P0,P1, . . . ,Pk) to denote such a preference.
Let D0i be a collection of swap-connected component orderings, and for each compo-
nent l, let D li be a collection of swap-connected marginal preferences over the elements
Al . We denote by Li = (D
0
i ,D
1
i , . . . ,D
k
i ) the lexicographically separable domain con-
taining all lexicographically separable preferences with component orders in D0i and
marginal preferences inD1i ×·· ·×D
k
i , that is, Li = {(P
0
i ,P
1
i , . . . ,P
k
i ) | (P
0
i ,P
1
i , . . . ,P
k
i )∈
D
0
i ×D
1
i ×·· ·×D
k
i }.
Two preferences P= (P0,P1, . . . ,Pk) and P¯= (P¯0, P¯1, . . . , P¯k) are lex-local if there
exists l ∈ K∪{0} such that Pl and P¯l are swap-local and P j = P¯ j for all j 6= l.
We introduce a simpler (and stronger) version of lower contour monotonicity for
lexicographic domains, which we call lex-monotonicity.
Definition 9.1. An RSCF ϕ : LN → A is lex-monotonic if for all i ∈ N, all Pi, P¯i ∈Li
such that Pi and P¯i are lex-local, and all P−i ∈L−i, we have
(i) if P¯0i is an (l, j)-swap of P
0
i for some l, j ∈ K, then ϕ is lower contour monotonic
on the pair ((Pi,P−i), (P¯i,P−i)), and
(ii) if P¯li is an (x
l ,yl)-swap of Pli for some x
l ,yl ∈Al , then ϕ(a−l ,yl)(Pi,P−i)≤ϕ(a−l ,yl)(P¯i,P−i)
for all a−l ∈ A−l .
The following corollary is obtained from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 9.1. If an RSCF ϕ : LN → A satisfies lex-monotonicity, then almost all
lex-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are lex-LDSIC.
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Since lex-LDSIC implies DSIC for DSCFs on lexicographic domains in which
component orderings are swap-connected and marginal domains are regular and swap-
DLGE (see Kumar et al. (2020) for details), it follows that for almost all lex-monotonic
DSCFs, OBIC and DSIC are equivalent.
Corollary 9.2. Let D0 be swap-connected, and let D l be regular and swap-DLGE for
all l = 1, . . . ,k. Suppose Li = (D
0,D1, . . . ,Dk) for all i ∈ N. If a DSCF f : LN → A
satisfies lex-monotonicity, then almost all lex-LOBIC DBRs with DSCF f are DSIC.
9.2 FULL SEPARABLE DOMAINS
For a collection of marginal preferences (P1, . . . ,Pk), the collection of all separable
preferences with marginals as (P1, . . . ,Pk) is denoted by S (P1, . . . ,Pk). Similarly, for a
collection of marginal domains (D1, . . . ,Dk), the set of all separable preferences with
marginals in (D1, . . . ,Dk) is denoted by S (D1, . . . ,Dk), that is, S (D1, . . . ,Dk) =
∪(P1,...,Pk)∈(D1,...,Dk)S (P
1, . . . ,Pk). A separable domain of the form S (D1, . . . ,Dk) is
called a full separable domain. Throughout this subsection, we assume that the marginal
domains are betweenness domains satisfying swap-connectedness and consistency, for
instance, they can be any domain we have discussed so far except the intermediate
domain. For PN ∈S (D
1, . . . ,Dk), we denote its restriction to a component l ∈ K by PlN ,
that is, PlN = (P
l
1, . . . ,P
l
n). We introduce the local structure in a full separable domain in
a natural way.
Definition 9.2. Let D l be swap-connected for all l ∈ K. Two preferences P, P¯ ∈
S (D1, . . . ,Dk) are sep-local if one of the following two holds:
(i) P△P¯= {x,y} where x,y are such that |{l | xl 6= yl}| ≥ 2.
(ii) P△P¯= {((a−l ,xl), (a−l ,yl)) | a−l ∈ A−l}, where l ∈ K and xl ,yl ∈ Al swap from
Pl to P¯l .
Thus, (i) in Definition 9.2 says that exactly one pair of alternatives (x,y), that vary
over at least two components, swap from P to P′, and (ii) in Definition 9.2 says that
multiple pairs of alternatives of the form ((a−l ,xl), (a−l ,yl)), where a−l ∈ A−l , swaps
from P to P′. This structure makes the lower contour monotonicity property simpler:
it imposes elementary monotonicity to every pair of swapping alternatives. We call it
sep-monotonicity.
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Remark 9.1. Let l ∈ K and let pi l = (pi l(1), . . . ,pi l(t)) be a swap-local path in D l such
that the relative ordering of two alternatives xl ,yl ∈ Al remains the same along the path.
Then, for every component ordering P0 ∈P(K) having l as the worst component, and
for every collection of marginal preferences (P1, . . . ,Pl−1,Pl+1, . . . ,Pk) over components
other than l, the relative ordering of any two alternatives in the set {a ∈ A | al ∈ {xl ,yl}}
will remain the same along the sep-local path ((P0,P1, . . . ,Pl−1,pi l(1),Pl+1, . . . ,Pk), . . . ,
(P0,P1, . . . ,Pl−1,pi l(t),Pl+1, . . . ,Pk)) in the domain S (D1, . . . ,Dk).
For notational convenience, we denote a domain S (D1, . . . ,Dk) by S in the follow-
ing results. The following corollary is obtained from Theorem 5.1.
Corollary 9.3. If an RSCF ϕ : S n → ∆A satisfies sep-monotonicity, then almost all
sep-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are sep-LDSIC.
It is worth mentioning that Corollary 9.3 holds as long as the marginal domains are
swap-connected.
Our next two propositions are derived by using Theorem 5.3. An RSCF ϕ : S n→ ∆A
satisfies component-unanimity if for each component l ∈ K and each PN ∈S
n such
that Pli (1) = x
l for all i ∈ N and some xl ∈ Al , we have ϕ l
xl
(PN) = 1.
Proposition 9.1. Almost all unanimous and sep-LOBIC RBRs on a full separable domain
satisfies component-unanimity.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix C.10.
Proposition 9.2. Almost all unanimous and sep-LOBIC RBRs on a full separable domain
are tops-only.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix C.11.
For random rules, to the best of our knowledge, it is still not known whether sep-
LDSIC implies DSIC or not. However, the same is shown for DSCFs on domains
having unrestricted marginals (see Kumar et al. (2020) for details). Thus, it follows from
Corollary 9.3 that for almost all sep-monotonic DSCFs, OBIC and DSIC are equivalent
on such domains.
9.2.1 MARGINAL DECOMPOSABILITY OF RANDOM RULES
Breton and Sen (1999) show that every unanimous and DSIC DSCF on a multi-dimensional
(full) separable domain is decomposable: its outcome in a particular dimension depends
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only on the (marginal) preferences of agents in that dimension. In our view, a suitable
version of decomposability for random rules is marginal decomposability, which we
investigate for sep-LOBIC rules in this section.
The marginal distribution of an RSCF ϕ : S n → ∆A over component l ∈ K at a
preference profile PN , denoted by ϕ
l(PN), is defined as ϕ
l
xl
(PN) = ∑
x−l∈A−l
ϕ(xl ,x−l)(PN)
for all xl ∈ Al .
Definition 9.3. An RSCF ϕ : S n → ∆A is marginally decomposable if for all l ∈ K
and all PN , P¯N ∈S
n with PlN = P¯
l
N , we have ϕ
l(PN) = ϕ
l(P¯N).
Remark 9.2. Note that for a DSCF f : S n → A, marginal decomposability is equivalent
to decomposability defined as follows: a DSCF f : S n → A is decomposable if for
all l ∈ K and all PN , P¯N ∈S
n with PlN = P¯
l
N , we have f
l(PN) = f
l(P¯N). Here, f
l(PN)
denotes the l-th component of f (PN). Thus, our notion of marginal decomposability
indeed generalizes the notion of decomposability for random rules.
Theorem 9.1. Almost all unanimous and sep-LOBIC RBRs on a full separable domain
are marginally decomposable.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.12.
10. WEAK PREFERENCES
A weak preference is a complete and transitive binary relation. We denote a weak
preference by R and the set of all weak preferences by R(A). For a weak preference
R, we denote its strict part by P and indifference part by I. An indifference class of a
preference is the maximal set of alternatives that are indifferent to each other.
As in the case of strict preferences, we assume that each domain Di ⊆Ri is endowed
with a graph structure with respect to which it is connected. We generalize the definition
of a block for weak preferences in the following way. A set of alternatives B is a block
in a pair of preferences (R,R′) if it is a minimal non-empty set satisfying the following
properties: (i) for all x ∈ B and y /∈ B, P|{x,y} = P
′|{x,y}, and (ii) B is not a strict subset of
an indifference class of R and an indifference class of R′.
Note that the technical definition of lower contour monotonicity and block preserva-
tion property (Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.1) do not involve the assumption of strict
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preferences, therefore we continue to use the same definitions for weak preferences.
Our next two results say that Proposition 5.1 and Theorem 5.1 continue to hold in this
scenario.
Proposition 10.1. Almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs satisfy the block preservation property.
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 10.1. If an RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A satisfies lower contour monotonicity, then
almost all graph-LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ are graph-LDSIC.
The proof of this theorem is relegated to Appendix C.1.
11. DISCUSSION
11.1 THE CASE OF DBRS
A probability distribution ν on a finite set S is generic if for all subsets U and V of S,
ν(U) = ν(V ) impliesU = V . Majumdar and Sen (2004) show that on the unrestricted
domain, every unanimous DBR that is OBIC with respect to a generic prior is dictatorial,
and Mishra (2016) shows that under elementary monotonicity, the notions DSIC and
OBIC with respect to generic priors are equivalent. It can be verified that all our results
hold for generic priors if we restrict our attention to DBRs. Additionally, our results
establish further structure (such as tops-onlyness, Pareto optimality, only-topsetness,
decomposability) of OBIC DBRs with respect to generic priors.
11.2 FULLY CORRELATED PRIORS
Note that the priors we consider in this paper are partially correlated: prior of an agent
is independent of her own preference, while it may be correlated over the preferences
of other agents. The natural question arises here as to what will happen if the prior of
an agent depends on her own preferences too. Firstly, our proof technique for Theorem
5.1 will fail, but more importantly, Theorem 5.1 will not even hold anymore. It can
be verified from the proof of Proposition 5.1 that if an RSCF is graph-LOBIC but not
graph-LDSIC then it must satisfy a system of equations . The proof follows from the
fact that the set of priors that satisfy such a system of equations has Lebesgue measure
zero. However, if an agent has two different priors for two local preferences, then
we cannot obtain such a system of equations on a given prior (what we obtain are
30
equations involving different priors), and consequently, nothing can be concluded about
the Lebesgue measure of such priors. We illustrate this with the following example.
Suppose that there are two agents 1 and 2, and three alternatives a,b, and c. Consider
two swap-local preferences bac and bca of agent 1. Consider the anti-plurality rule
with the tie-breaking criteria as a≻ b≻ c. In Table 4, we present this rule when agent
1 has preferences bac and bca, and 2 has any preference. It is well-known (and also
can be verified from the example) that anti-plurality rule is not swap-LDSIC. However,
it is swap-LOBIC over the mentioned preferences of agent 1 if her prior satisfies the
following conditions: µ1(bca|cab) + µ1(cba|cab)− µ1(acb|cab)− µ1(cab|cab) ≥ 0
and µ1(acb|cba)+ µ1(cab|cba)− µ1(bca|cba)− µ1(cba|cba) ≥ 0. It is clear that the
Lebesgue measure of such priors is not zero (as we have argued, the equality is imposed
on two different priors µ1(·|cab) and µ1(·|cba)). It can be verified that if one considers
all possible restrictions arising from all possible swap-local preferences of each agent,
the resulting priors for which the rule is LOBIC will have Lebesgue measure strictly
bigger than zero.
1 2 abc acb bac bca cba cab
cab a a a c a c
cba b c b b c b
Table 4
APPENDIX
A. PRELIMINARIES FOR THE PROOFS
Consider an RSCF ϕ : DN → ∆A. A prior profile µN is called compatible with ϕ if for
all i ∈ N, all Pi,P
′
i ∈Di, and all X ( A,
∑
R−i
µi(R−i)(ϕX (Ri,R−i)−ϕX (R
′
i,R−i)) = 0 (1)
=⇒ ϕX (Ri,R−i)−ϕX (R
′
i,R−i) = 0 for all R−i.
Let M (ϕ) denote the set of all priors that are compatible with ϕ .
Claim A.1. For every RSCF ϕ , the Lebesgue measure of the set M (ϕ) is 1.
Proof of Claim A.1. The proof of this claim follows from elementary measure theory;
we provide a sketch of it for the sake of completeness. First note that for a given RSCF
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ϕ , (1) is equivalent to an equation of the form:
x1α1+ · · ·+ xkαk = 0, (2)
where α’s are some constants and x’s are non-negative variables summing up to 1 (that
is, probabilities). The question is if x’s are drawn randomly (uniformly) from the space
{(x1, . . . ,xk) | xl ≥ 0 for all l and ∑
l
xl = 1}, what is the Lebesgue measure of the priors
for which (2) will be satisfied? Clearly, if α’s are all zeros, (2) will be satisfied for all
priors. We argue that it if α’s are not all zeros, then (2) can be satisfied only for a set
of priors with Lebesgue measure zero, which will complete the proof. However, this
follows from the facts that the solutions of (2) form a hyperplane and that the Lebesgue
measure of a hyperplane is zero (because of dimensional reduction, such as the Lebesgue
measure of a line in a plane is zero, that of a plane in a cube is zero, etc.).10 
B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1 AND PROPOSITION 10.1
Proof. Let (ϕ ,µN) be a graph-LOBIC RBR. Since we prove the claim for almost all
graph-LOBIC RBRs, in view of Claim A.1, we assume that µN is compatible with ϕ .
Consider graph-local preferences Ri,R
′
i ∈Di and R−i ∈D−i. Suppose that B is a block
in (Ri,R
′
i). Let UB(Ri) = {x ∈ A | xPib for all b ∈ B} be the set of alternatives that are
strictly preferred to each element of B according to Ri. By the definition of a block in
(Ri,R
′
i), it follows that bothUB(Ri) andUB(Ri)∪B are upper contour sets in each of the
preferences Ri and R
′
i. Since Ri and R
′
i are graph-local, by graph-LOBIC,
∑
R−i∈D−i
µi(R−i)ϕUB(Ri)(Ri,R−i) = ∑
R−i∈D−i
µi(R−i)ϕUB(Ri)(R
′
i,R−i) (3)
and
∑
R−i∈D−i
µi(R−i)ϕUB(Ri)∪B(Ri,R−i) = ∑
R−i∈D−i
µi(R−i)ϕUB(Ri)∪B(R
′
i,R−i). (4)
Subtracting (3) from (4), we have
∑
R−i∈D−i
µi(R−i)(ϕB(Ri,R−i)−ϕB(R
′
i,R−i)) = 0.
10For a detailed argument, suppose that exactly one α , say α1 is not zero. Note that this assumption
gives maximum freedom for the values of x’s and thereby maximize the Lebesgue measure of the solution
space of (2). However, this means in any solution x1 must be zero, the measure of which in the solution
space is zero.
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Since µN is compatible with ϕ , this means ϕB(Ri,R−i) = ϕB(R
′
i,R−i) for all R−i ∈D−i,
which completes the proof. 
C. OTHER PROOFS
In view of Proposition 5.1, whenever we prove some statement for almost all graph-
LOBIC RBRs with RSCF ϕ in this section, we assume that the RSCF ϕ satisfies the
block preservation property.
C.1 PROOF OF THEOREM 5.1 AND THEOREM 10.1
Proof. Let ϕ : DN → ∆A be an RSCF satisfying lower contour monotonicity and the
block preservation property. We show that ϕ is graph-LDSIC. Consider graph-local pref-
erences Ri,R
′
i ∈Di, R−i ∈D−i, and x∈ A. We show ϕU(x,Ri)(Ri,R−i)≥ ϕU(x,Ri)(R
′
i,R−i).
Let B1, . . . ,Bt be the blocks in (Ri,R
′
i) such that for all l < t and all b ∈ Bl and b
′ ∈ Bl+1,
we have bPib
′. Suppose that x ∈ Bl for some l ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Let Bˆl = {b ∈ Bl | bPix} be the set of alternatives (possibly empty) in Bl that are
(strictly) preferred to x. Note that the set Bl \ Bˆl is lower contour set of Ri|Bl . Therefore,
by lower contour monotonicity,
ϕBl\Bˆl (R
′
i,R−i) ≥ ϕBl\Bˆl (Ri,R−i). (5)
Furthermore, by the block preservation property, we have
ϕBl (R
′
i,R−i) = ϕBl (Ri,R−i). (6)
Subtracting (5) from (6), we have
ϕBˆl (Ri,R−i) ≥ ϕBˆl (R
′
i,R−i). (7)
Note thatU(x,Ri) =B1∪·· ·∪Bl−1∪Bˆl . This means ϕU(x,Ri)(Ri,R−i) =ϕB1∪···∪Bl−1(Ri,R−i)+
ϕBˆl (Ri,R−i) and ϕU(x,Ri)(R
′
i,R−i) = ϕB1∪···∪Bl−1(R
′
i,R−i)+ϕBˆl (R
′
i,R−i). By the block
preservation property, ϕB1∪···∪Bl−1(Ri,R−i) =ϕB1∪···∪Bl−1(R
′
i,R−i), and by (7) , ϕBˆl (Ri,R−i)≥
ϕBˆl (R
′
i,R−i). Combining these observations, we have ϕU(x,Ri)(Ri,R−i)≥ϕU(x,Ri)(R
′
i,R−i),
which completes the proof. 
33
C.2 PROOF OF THEOREM 5.2
Proof. Let Di satisfy upper contour preservation property for all i ∈ N and suppose that
ϕ : DN → ∆A is an RSCF satisfying unanimity and the block preservation property. We
show that ϕ is Pareto optimal. Consider PN ∈DN such that xPiy for all i ∈ N and some
x,y ∈ A. We show that ϕy(PN) = 0. Assume for contradiction ϕy(PN) > 0. Consider
i ∈ N. By the upper contour preservation property there exists a graph-local path
(P1i = Pi, . . . ,P
t
i ) such that P
t
i (1) = x andU(Pi,y) =U(P
l
i ,y) for all l = 1, . . . , t. Since
U(y,P1i ) =U(y,P
2
i ), we have y /∈ P
1
i △P
2
i , which implies that {y} is a singleton block
in (P1i ,P
2
i ). By the block preservation property, this implies ϕy(P
2
i ,P−i) = ϕy(Pi,P−i).
Continuing in this manner, we reach a preference profile (Pti ,P−i) such that P
t
i (1) = x
and ϕy(P
t
i ,P−i) > 0. By applying the same argument to the agents j ∈ N \{i} we can
construct a preference profile P′N such that P
′
j(1) = x for all j ∈ N and ϕy(P
′
N) > 0.
Since P′j(1) = x for all j ∈ N, by unanimity we have ϕx(P
′
N) = 1, which contradicts that
ϕy(P
′
N) > 0. 
C.3 PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3
We use the following lemma in our proof.
Lemma C.1. Suppose an RSCF ϕ : Dn→∆A satisfies unanimity and the block preserva-
tion property. Let Pi,P
′
i ∈D be graph-local and let P−i ∈D
n−1 be such that ϕx(Pi,P−i) 6=
ϕx(P
′
i ,P−i) for some x ∈ Pi△P
′
i . Consider an agent j 6= i and suppose that there is a
graph-local path (P1j = Pj, . . . ,P
t
j = P¯j) such that for all l < t and for every two alterna-
tives a,b ∈ Pi△P
′
i , there is a common upper contour set U of both P
l
j and P
l+1
j such that
exactly one of a and b is contained in U. Then ϕx(Pi, P¯j,P−{i, j}) 6= ϕx(P
′
i , P¯j,P−{i, j}).
Proof of Lemma C.1. Suppose ϕx(Pi,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) 6= ϕx(P
′
i ,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) for some l < t and
some x ∈ Pi△P
′
i . It is enough to show that ϕx(Pi,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}) 6= ϕx(P
′
i ,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}).
Let a and a¯ be the alternatives, if exist, that are ranked just above and just below x,
respectively, in Plj |Pi△P′i . More formally, let a ∈ Pi△P
′
i be such that aP
l
jx and no al-
ternative in Pi△P
′
i is ranked between a and x, and let a¯ ∈ Pi△P
′
i be such that xP
l
j a¯
and no alternative in Pi△P
′
i is ranked between x and a. Let U be the common up-
per contour set of Plj and P
l+1
j such that U ∩{a,x} = a, and Û be the common upper
contour set of Plj and P
l+1
j such that Û ∩ {x, a¯} = x. Here, U might be empty and
34
Û might be A. Consider the set of alternatives B = U \ Û . Note that B can be ex-
pressed as a union of blocks in (Plj ,P
l+1
j ). Therefore, by applying the block preserva-
tion property to each block in B, we obtain ϕB(Pi,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) = ϕB(Pi,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j})
and ϕB(P
′
i ,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) = ϕB(P
′
i ,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}). Moreover, since each c ∈ B \ x is a
block in (Pi,P
′
i ), we have by the block preservation property, ϕc(Pi,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) =
ϕc(P
′
i ,P
l
j ,P−{i, j}) and ϕc(Pi,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}) = ϕc(P
′
i ,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}) for all c ∈ B\ x. Com-
bining these observations, it follows that ϕx(Pi,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}) 6= ϕx(P
′
i ,P
l+1
j ,P−{i, j}). 
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let D satisfy the path-richness property (see Definition 5.3) and
suppose that ϕ : Dn → ∆A is an RSCF satisfying unanimity and the block preservation
property. We show that ϕ is tops-only. Assume for contradiction that ϕ(Pi,P−i) 6=
ϕ(P′i ,P−i) for some Pi,P
′
i ∈D with Pi(1) = P
′
i (1) and some P−i ∈D
n−1. By means of
Condition (i) of the path-richness property, it is enough to assume that Pi and P
′
i are
graph-local. Therefore, by the block preservation property, it follows that ϕx(Pi,P−i) 6=
ϕx(P
′
i ,P−i) for some x ∈ Pi△P
′
i .
Consider j ∈ N \ {i}. By Condition (ii) of the path-richness property, there is a
path (P1j = Pj, . . . ,P
t
j = P
′
j) with P
′
j(1) = Pi(1) such that for all l < t and for every
two alternatives a,b ∈ Pi△P
′
i , there is a common upper contour set U of both P
l
j and
Pl+1j such that exactly one of a and b is contained in U . By applying Lemma C.1, it
follows that ϕx(Pi,P
′
j,P−i) 6= ϕx(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−i). By applying this logic to all agents except
i, we construct P′−iD
n−1 such that P′j(1) = Pi(1) for all j 6= i and ϕx(Pi,P
′
−i) 6= ϕx(P
′
N).
However, since (Pi,P
′
−i) and (P
′
i ,P
′
−i) are unanimous preference profiles with the top-
ranked alternative different from x, ϕx(Pi,P
′
−i) = ϕx(P
′
i ,P
′
−i) = 0, a contradiction. 
C.4 PROOF OF THEOREM 5.4
Proof. Let D satisfy top-connectedness and suppose that ϕ : Dn → ∆A is a unanimous,
tops-only RSCF satisfying the block preservation property. We show that ϕ is only-
topset. Assume for contradiction ϕx(PN) > 0 for some x /∈ τ(D) and some PN ∈ D
n.
Let P2(1) = a and P1(1) = b. Since D is top-connected, there exists a sequence (x
l =
a,x2, . . . ,xt = b) such that xl ,xl+1 are top-connected for all l < t. Since x1 and x2 are
top-connected, there exist graph-local preferences P′2,P
′′
2 ∈ D such that P
′
2 ≡ x
1x2 · · ·
and P′′2 ≡ x
2x1 · · · with P′2|A\{x1,x2} = P
′′
2 |A\{x1,x2}. Because ϕ is tops-only and P
′
2(1) =
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P2(1), ϕx(P1,P
′
2,P−{1,2}) = ϕx(P1,P2,P−{1,2}). Again by the block preservation property
ϕx(P1,P
′′
2 ,P−{1,2}) = ϕx(P1,P
′
2,P−{1,2}). Combining these we have ϕx(P1,P
′′
2 ,P−{1,2}) =
ϕx(P1,P2,P−{1,2}). Continuing in this manner, we can arrive at a preference P˜2 such that
P˜2(1) = b and ϕx(P1, P˜2,P−{1,2}) = ϕx(P1,P2,P−{1,2}). Applying the same argument
to the agents in {3, . . . ,n} we construct P˜N ∈ D
n such that P˜1 = P1, P˜i(1) = b for all
i ∈ {2, . . . ,n} and ϕx(P˜N) = ϕx(PN) > 0. However this contradicts unanimity. 
C.5 PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1
Proof. Let D be swap-connected and suppose that ϕ : DN → ∆A is a tops-only RSCF
satisfying weak elementary monotonicity and the block preservation property. We show
that ϕ is swap-LDSIC.
Let Pi and P
′
i be two swap-local preferences. If τ(Pi) = τ(P
′
i ), then by tops-onlyness,
ϕ(Pi,P−i) = ϕ(P
′
i ,P−i), and we are done. So, suppose Pi ≡ ab · · · and P
′
i ≡ ba · · · .
Assume for contradiction that ϕa(Pi,P−i) < ϕa(P
′
i ,P−i). By the block preservation
property, ϕ{a,b}(Pi,P−i) = ϕ{a,b}(P
′
i ,P−i), and hence our assumption for contradiction
means ϕb(Pi,P−i) > ϕb(P
′
i ,P−i). Consider an agent j ∈ N \ i such that τ(Pj) /∈ {a,b}.
Note that since D j is swap-connected one of the following two cases must hold for Pj: (i)
there is a swap-local path from Pj to a preference P
′
j ≡ a · · · such that b does not appear
as the top-ranked alternative in any preference in the path, (ii) there is a swap-local
path from Pj to a preference P
′
j ≡ b · · · such that a does not appear as the top-ranked
alternative in any preference in the path.
Suppose Case (i) holds. Let B be the set of alternative that appear as the top-ranked
alternative in some preference in the mentioned path. Consider the outcomes of ϕ when
agent j changes her preferences along the path, while all other agents keep their prefer-
ences unchanged. By tops-onlyness, the outcome can change only when the top-ranked
alternative changes along the path. Moreover, by the definition of swap-local path, the
top-ranked alternative can change along the path only through a swap between two alter-
natives in B. By block preservation, this implies that the probability of the two swapping
alternatives can only change in any such situations, and hence, the probability of the al-
ternatives outside B will remain unchanged at the end of the path. Since b /∈ B, this yields
ϕb(Pi,Pj,P−{i, j}) = ϕb(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j}) and ϕb(P
′
i ,Pj,P−{i, j}) = ϕb(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}). This,
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together with our assumption for contradiction that ϕb(Pi,P−i) > ϕb(P
′
i ,P−i), implies
ϕb(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j}) > ϕb(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}). Now, since Pi△P
′
i = {a,b}, we have by block
preservation, ϕ{a,b}(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j}) = ϕ{a,b}(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}). Because ϕb(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j})>
ϕb(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}), this yields ϕa(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j})< ϕa(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}). Using similar logic,
we can conclude for Case (ii) that ϕa(Pi,P
′
j,P−{i, j}) < ϕa(P
′
i ,P
′
j,P−{i, j}).
Note that the preceding argument holds no matter what the preferences of the agents
in N \ {i, j} are. Therefore, by repeated application of this argument for each agent
j ∈ N \ i with τ(Pj) /∈ {a,b}, we obtain P
′
−i ∈ D−i of the agents in N \ i such that (i)
τ(P′j) ∈ {a,b} for each j ∈ N \ i, and (ii) ϕa(Pi,P
′
−i) < ϕa(P
′
i ,P
′
−i).
We now complete the proof by means of tops-onlyness. If P′j ≡ a · · · then let
P′′j = Pi, and if P
′
j ≡ b · · · then let P
′′
j = P
′
i . By tops-onlyness, ϕ(Pi,P
′
−i) = ϕ(Pi,P
′′
−i)
and ϕ(P′i ,P
′
−i) = ϕ(P
′
i ,P
′′
−i), and hence, ϕa(Pi,P
′′
−i) < ϕa(P
′
i ,P
′′
−i). However, since for
each j ∈ N, either P′′j ≡ Pi or P
′′
j ≡ P
′
i , this violates weak elementary monotonicity, a
contradiction. 
C.6 PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2
Proof. Let D satisfy the top-swap richness property and suppose that ϕ : Dn → ∆A is a
Pareto optimal, tops-only RSCF satisfying the block preservation property. We show that
ϕ is swap-LDSIC. To show that ϕ is swap-LDSIC, by Theorem 6.1, it is sufficient to show
that ϕ is weak elementary monotonic. Consider swap-local preferences Pi, P¯i ∈D such
that Pi ≡ ab · · · and P¯i ≡ ba · · · . Assume for contradiction that ϕb(Pi,P−i) > ϕb(P¯i,P−i)
for some P−i ∈D
n−1 such that Pi(k) = P¯i(k) = Pj(k) for all j ∈ N \ i and all k > 2. Let
c be the alternative such that Pi ≡ abc · · · . Because Pi and P¯i are swap-local, this means
P¯i ≡ bac · · · . Consider P
1
i ∈ D such that P
1
i = acb · · · and P
1
i and Pi are swap-local,
that is P1i △Pi = {b,c}. By tops-onlyness of ϕ , ϕ(P
1
i ,P−i) = ϕ(Pi,P−i). Next, consider
P2i ∈D such that P
2
i ≡ cab · · · and P
2
i and P
1
i are swap-local. By the block preservation
property, ϕb(P
2
i ,P−i) = ϕb(P
1
i ,P−i). Now, consider P
3
i ∈D such that P
3
i ≡ cba · · · and
P3i and P
2
i are swap-local. By tops-onlyness of ϕ , ϕ(P
3
i ,P−i) = ϕ(P
2
i ,P−i). Finally,
consider P4i ∈D such that P
4
i ≡ bca · · · and P
4
i and P
3
i are swap-local. Since bP
4
i c and
bPjc for all j ∈ N \ i, we have by Pareto optimality, ϕc(P
4
i ,P−i) = 0. Moreover, by the
block preservation property, we have ϕb(P
4
i ,P−i) = ϕb(P
3
i ,P−i) + ϕc(P
3
i ,P−i). This,
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together with the fact that ϕb(P
3
i ,P−i) = ϕb(Pi,P−i), implies ϕb(P
4
i ,P−i) ≥ ϕb(Pi,P−i).
By our assumption, this means that ϕb(P
4
i ,P−i) > ϕb(P¯i,P−i). Since P
4
i (1) = P¯i(1)
which contradicts that ϕ is tops-only. 
C.7 PROOF OF COROLLARY 7.1
First, we state some important observations about betweenness domains which we will
use in the proof.
Observation C.1. Consider an alternative x ∈ A and let Dx(β ) be the set of all prefer-
ences with top-ranked alternative x and satisfying the betweenness condition β . Then,
the domain Dx(β ) is swap-connected.
Observation C.2. Let x,y∈A and let P∈D(β ) be such that P(1) = x andU(y,P)∪y=
β (x,y). Then, for all Pˆ ≡ x · · · , there is a swap-local path from Pˆ to P such that no
alternative overtakes y along the path.
Observation C.3. Let D(β ) be strongly consistent. Let x, x¯∈ A and let (x1 = x, . . . ,xt =
x¯) be a sequence of adjacent alternatives in β (x, x¯) such that for all l < t and all
w ∈ β (xl , x¯), we have β (xl+1,w) ⊆ β (xl , x¯). Then, for all l < t, there exist P ≡ xl · · ·
and P′ ≡ xl+1 · · · such that β (xl ,xt) is an upper contour set in both P and P′. To see
this, consider xl . Since D(β ) is strongly consistent, there is a preference P ∈ D(β )
such that β (xl ,xt) is an upper contour set of P. Name the alternatives in β (xl ,xt) as
w1, . . . ,wu such that β (x
l+1,wr) ( β (x
l+1,ws) implies r < s. Since D(β ) is strongly
consistent, we have β (xl+1,w) ⊆ β (xl ,xt) for all w ∈ β (xl ,xt), and hence there is
a preference P′, graph-local to P, satisfying the betweenness relation β such that
P′ ≡ w1w2 · · ·wu−1wu · · · . Therefore, U(wu,P
′)∪wu = β (x
l ,xt).
We are now ready to start the proof. To ease the presentation, for a path pi , we
denote by pi−1 the path pi in the reversed direction, that is, if pi = (P1,P2, . . . ,Pt), then
pi−1 = (Pt ,Pt−1, . . . ,P1).
Proof of Corollary 7.1. Let B be a collection of strongly consistent and swap-connected
betweenness relations. We show that D(B) satisfies the path-richness property.
First, we show D(B) satisfies Condition (i) of the path-richness property (see Defini-
tion 5.3). Consider P and P′ with P(1) = P′(1) that are not graph-local. If P,P′ ∈D(β )
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for some β ∈B, then by Observation C.1 there is a swap-local path from P to P′ such
that the top-ranked alternative does not change along the path. Suppose P ∈D(β ) and
P′ ∈D(βˆ ) for some β , βˆ ∈B. Let P(1) = P′(1) = x and let (β 1 = β , . . . ,β t = βˆ ) be
a swap-local path. By the swap-connectedness of B, there are swap-local preferences
P1 ∈D(β 1) and P2 ∈D(β 2) with P1(1) = P2(1) = x. By Observation C.1, there is a
swap-local path pi1 from P to P1 in D(β 1) such that x remains at the top-position in all
the preferences in the path. Thus, the path (pi1,P2) from P to P2 satisfies Condition (i)
of the path-richness property. Continuing in this manner, we can construct a path from P
to P′ that satisfies Condition (i) of the path-richness property.
Now, we show D(B) satisfies Condition (ii) of the path-richness property, that is, for
all P,P′ ∈D(B) with P(1) = P′(1), if P and P′ are graph-local, then for each preference
Pˆ ∈ D(B), there exists a graph-local path (P1 = Pˆ, . . . ,Pv) with Pv(1) = P(1) such
that for all l < v and all distinct a,b ∈ P△P′, there is a common upper contour set U
of both Pl and Pl+1 such that exactly one of a and b is contained in U . Since P and
P′ are graph-local with P(1) = P′(1), by means of the fact that the collection B is
swap-connected, it follows that P and P′ are swap-local. So assume that P≡ w · · ·yz · · ·
and P′ ≡ w · · ·zy · · · . Consider Pˆ ∈ D(B). Suppose Pˆ(1) = x and yPˆz. Let Pˆ ∈ D(β )
for some β ∈B. We construct a path from Pˆ to a preference with w as the top-ranked
alternative maintaining Condition (ii) of the path-richness property with respect to y and
z in two steps. For ease of presentation, we denote Pˆ by P1.
Step 1: Since β is strongly consistent, there is a sequence (x1 = x, . . . ,xt = y) of adjacent
alternatives in β (x1,xt) such that for all l < t and all u ∈ β (xl ,xt), β (xl ,xt)⊇ β (xl+1,u).
By Observation C.2, there is a path pi1 from P1 to a preference P¯1 with P¯1(1) = x1 such
thatU(xt , P¯1)∪xt = β (x1,xt) and no alternative overtakes xt along the path. Consider x2.
By Observation C.3, there is a preference P2 with P2(1) = x2 such that P2 is graph-local
to P¯1 and β (x1,xt) is an upper contour set in P2. Since z /∈ β (x1,xt) and β (x1,xt) is a
common upper contour set of P¯1 and P2, Condition (ii) of the path-richness property
is satisfied with respect to xt and z on the path (P¯1,P2). As in the case for P1 and P¯1,
by Observation C.2, we can construct a swap-local path pi2 from P2 to some preference
P¯2 with P¯2(1) = x2 such thatU(xt , P¯2)∪ xt = β (x2,xt) and no alternative overtakes xt
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along the path. As in the case for P¯1 and P2, by Observation C.3, there is a preference P3
with P3(1) = x3 such that P3 is graph-local to P¯2 and β (x2,xt) is an upper contour set in
P3. It follows that the path (pi1,pi2,P3) from P1 to the preference P3 satisfies Condition
(ii) of the path-richness property with respect to xt and z. Continuing in this manner,
we can construct a path pˆi in D(β ) from Pˆ to a preference ˆˆP with ˆˆP(1) = y such that
Condition (ii) of the path-richness property is satisfied along the path.
Step 2: Consider the preference P≡ w · · ·yz · · · . Let P ∈D(β˜ ) for some β˜ ∈B. Using
similar argument as in Step 1, we can construct a path p˜i in D(β˜ ) from P to some P˜ with
P˜(1) = y such that Condition (ii) of the path-richness property is satisfied with respect
to y and z.
Step 3: Since ˆˆP(1) = P˜(1) = y and the collection B is swap-connected, there is a
swap-local path p¯i in D(B) from ˆˆP to P˜ such that y stays as the top-ranked alternative
in each preference of the path. Clearly, such a path will satisfy Condition (ii) of the
path-richness property with respect to y and z.
Consider the path (pˆi , p¯i , p˜i−1) from Pˆ to P. By construction, this path satisfies
Condition (ii) of the path-richness property with respect to y and z, which completes the
proof. 
C.8 PROOF OF THEOREM 7.1
Proof. Kumar et al. (2020) show that a domain D is graph-DLGE if and only if it
satisfies the following property: for all distinct P,P′ ∈ D and all a ∈ A, there exists a
path pi from P to P′ with no (a,b)-restoration for all b ∈ L(a,P). Here, a path is said
to have no (a,b)-restoration if the relative ranking of a and b is reversed at most once
along pi . In what follows, we show that D(B) satisfies the above-mentioned property
when B is weakly consistent and swap-connected. Consider two preferences P ∈D(β )
and P′ ∈D(β ′) for some β ,β ′ ∈B and a ∈ A. We show that there is a path pi from P to
P′ that has no (a,x)-restoration for all x ∈ L(a,P). By Observation C.3, from P and P′
there are graph-local paths pˆi and p¯i , respectively, to some preferences Pˆ and P¯ with a as
the top-ranked alternatives such that no alternative overtakes a along each of the paths.
Let p˜i be a swap-local path joining Pˆ and P¯ such that a remains the top-ranked alternative
throughout the path. Consider the path (pˆi , p˜i , p¯i−1). No alternative in L(a,P) overtakes
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a along the path pˆi . So, if there is an (a,x)-restoration for some x ∈ L(a,P) in the path
(pˆi , p˜i , p¯i−1), then it must be that the restoration happens in the path p¯i−1. However, then
a must overtake x in this path, which means x overtakes a in the reversed path p¯i , which
is not possible by the construction of the path p¯i . This completes the proof. 
C.9 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.2
Proof. Consider X , sX ∈ A. We show that there is a sequence (X1 = X , . . . ,X t = sX) of
adjacent alternatives in β (X , sX) such that for all l < t and allW ∈ β (X l ,X t), we have
β (X l+1,W )⊆ β (X l ,X t). Let l< t and considerW ∈ β (X l ,X t). We show β (X l+1,W )⊆
β (X l ,X t). Take Z /∈ β (X l ,X t). Because Z does not lie in β (X l ,X t), there must be a pair
(a,b) of objects such that either (i) a and b are together in both X l and X t , but separate
in Z, or (ii) a and b are separate in both X l and X t , but together in Z. Because both X l+1
andW are in β (X l ,X t), it must hold that in case (i) a and b are together in both X l+1 and
W , and in case (ii) they are separate in both X l+1 andW . In case (i), a and b are together
in both X l+1 andW but they are separate in Z. Therefore, Z cannot lie in β (X l+1,W ).
On the other hand, in case (ii) a and b are separate in both X l+1 andW , but they are
together in Z. Therefore, Z cannot lie in β (X l+1,W ). This completes the proof. 
C.10 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9.1
We first prove some lemmas which we later use in the proof of the proposition.
Lemma C.2. Let P ∈ S , l ∈ K, and x,y ∈ A be such that xlPlyl and xPy. Then, for
every component j 6= l there is a sep-local path from P to a lexicographic preference
P¯ ∈S having same marginal preferences as P, and l and j as the lexicographic best
and worst components, respectively, such that the x and y do not swap along the path.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality, l = 1 and j = m. First, make the component
1 lexicographically best (without changing the marginal preferences of P) by swapping
consecutively ranked alternatives multiple times in the following manner: each time
swap a pair of consecutively ranked alternatives a and b where a1P1b1 and bPa. Note
that since x1P1y1 and xPy, x and y are never swapped in this step. Having made 1
the lexicographically best component, the component 2 can be made lexicographically
second-best in the following manner: each time swap a pair of consecutively ranked
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alternatives a and b in P where a1 = b1, a2P2b2, and bPa. As we have explained for the
case of component 1, alternatives x and y will not swap in this process. Continuing in
this manner, we can finally obtain a preference P¯ with lexicographic ordering over the
components as 1P¯0 · · · P¯0k through a sep-local path along which the alternatives x and y
are not swapped. 
Lemma C.3. Let P∈S be a preference such that xPy for some alternatives x and y that
differ in at least two components. Then, there is a sep-local path (P1 = P, . . . ,Pt = Pˆ)
with Pˆ(1) = x such that xPly for all l < t.
Proof. Since xPy, there is a component l such that xlPlyl . Assume without loss of
generality l = 1. Consider component 2 . By Lemma C.2, there is a sep-local path pi1
from P to a preference P¯ having components 1 and 2 as the lexicographic best and the
worst components, respectively, such that x and y do not swap along the path. Since 2 is
the lexicographically worst component of P¯, we can construct a sep-local path from P¯ to
a preference ¯¯P such that (i) the marginal preferences in each component other than 2 and
the lexicographic ordering over the components of each preference in the path remains
the same as P¯, and (ii) x2 appears at the top-position of ¯¯P2. Since component 1 is the
lexicographic best component in all these preferences and x1 is preferred to y1 in the
marginal preference in component 1 for all these preferences, it follows that x remains
ranked above y along the path. Repeating this process for all the components 3, . . . ,k, we
can construct a path having no swap between x and y from P to a preference P˜ having (i)
the same marginal preference as P in component 1, and (ii) xt at the top-position of the
marginal preference in component t for all t > 1.
Starting from the preference P˜, make component 1 lexicographically worst through a
sep-local path without changing the marginal preferences. Since xl is weakly preferred
to yl in each component l in each preference of this path, x will remain ranked above y
throughout the path. Finally, move x1 to the top-position in the marginal preference in
component 1 thorough a(ny) swap-local path. Since x and y are different in at least two
components, there is a component j lexicographically dominating component 1 (as it is
the worst component) such that x j is preferred to y j in its marginal preference. Therefore,
x will be ranked above y throughout the path. Note that in the final preference, for each
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component t, xt appears at the top-position in the marginal preference in component t,
and hence the alternative x appears at the top-position in it. 
Lemma C.4. Let ϕ : S n → ∆A be a unanimous RSCF satisfying the block preservation
property. Then ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P¯N) for all PN , P¯N such that P
l
N = P¯
l
N for all l ∈ K.
Proof. It is enough to show that ϕ(Pi,P−i) = ϕ(P¯i,P−i) where P
l
i = P¯
l
i for all l ∈ K.
Since preferences with the same marginals are swap-connected, we can assume without
loss of generality that Pi and P¯i are swap-local with the swap of alternatives x and y.
Assume for contradiction ϕ(Pi,P−i) 6= ϕ(P¯i,P−i). By the block preservation property,
this means ϕx(Pi,P−i) 6= ϕx(P¯i,P−i). By Lemma C.3, for all j ∈ N \ i, there is a sep-
local path (P1j = Pj, . . . ,P
t
j = P¯j) with P¯j(1) = Pi(1) satisfying the property that for
all l < t there is a common upper contour setU of both Plj and P
l+1
j such that exactly
one of x and y is contained in U .11 By Lemma C.1, we have ϕx(Pi, P¯j,P−{i, j}) 6=
ϕx(P¯i, P¯j,P−{i, j}). Continuing in this manner, we can construct P¯−i ∈S
n−1 such that
P¯j(1) = Pi(1) for all j 6= i and ϕx(Pi, P¯−i) 6= ϕx(P¯i, P¯−i). However, since (Pi, P¯−i) and
(P¯i, P¯−i) are unanimous preference profiles with the top-ranked alternative different from
x, ϕx(Pi, P¯−i) = ϕx(P¯i, P¯−i) = 0, a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 9.1. Let ϕ : S n → ∆A be a unanimous RSCF satisfying the block
preservation property. We show that ϕ satisfies component-unanimity. Consider PN ∈
S
n such that Pli (1) = x
l for all i ∈ N, some l ∈ K, and some xl ∈ Al . Assume for
contradiction ϕ l
xl
(PN) 6= 1. Without loss of generality assume l = 1. By Lemma C.2 and
Lemma C.4, we can assume that PN is a profile of lexicographic preferences with each
agent i having the component ordering 1P0i · · ·P
0
i k. Fix some alternative x
k in component
k and consider some agent i. As we have argued in the proof of Lemma C.3, there is a
sep-local path from Pi to a preference P¯i such that each preference in the path has the
same lexicographic ordering over the components as Pi, P¯
k
i (1) = x
k, and P¯li = P
l
i for
all l 6= k. By construction, for all x−k ∈ A−k and yk,zk ∈ Ak, each pair of alternatives
((x−k,yk), (x−k,zk)) forms a block for any two consecutive (sep-local) preferences in
11Note that the statement of Lemma C.3 is slightly different from what we mention here. Since any
two consecutive preferences in a sep-local path differ by swaps of multiple pairs of consecutively ranked
alternatives, these two statements are equivalent.
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the path. This in particular implies ϕ1
x1
(P¯i,P−i) = ϕ
1
x1
(PN). Continuing this way, we can
construct P¯N ∈S
n such that P¯ki (1) = x
k for all i ∈ N and ϕ1
x1
(P¯N) = ϕ
1
x1
(PN).
Let ¯¯PN be the profile of lexicographic preferences that has same marginal preferences
as P¯ and has lexicographic ordering over the components as 1 ¯¯P0i . . .
¯¯P0i k
¯¯P0i k−1 for all
i ∈ N. That is, the components k−1 and k are swapped from P¯0i to
¯¯P0i . By Lemma C.4,
ϕ( ¯¯PN) = ϕ(P¯N). Now, by using similar logic as for component k, we can construct
PˆN ∈S
n such that Pˆk−1i (1) = x
k−1 for all i ∈ N and ϕ1
x1
(PˆN) = ϕ
1
x1
(PN). Continuing in
this manner, we can arrive at P˜N ∈S
n such that P˜ti (1) = x
t for all t ∈ K and all i ∈ N
and ϕ1
x1
(P˜N) = ϕ
1
x1
(PN). However, since P˜N is unanimous with P˜i(1) = x for all i ∈ N,
we have ϕx(P˜N) = 1, which in particular implies ϕ
1
x1
(P˜N) = 1, a contradiction. 
C.11 PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9.2
Proof. Let ϕ : S n → ∆A be a unanimous RSCF satisfying the block preservation
property. We show that ϕ is tops-only. Consider PN , P¯N ∈S
n with Pi(1) = P¯i(1) for all
i∈N. If PlN = P¯
l
N for all l ∈K, then we are done by Lemma C.4. It is sufficient to assume
that only one agent, say i, changes her marginal preference to a swap-local preference
in exactly one component, say t, and nothing else changes from PN to P¯N . That is, P
t
i
and P¯ti are swap-local with the swap of some y
t and zt , Ptj = P¯
t
j for all j ∈ N \ i, and
PlN = P¯
l
N for all l 6= t. Assume without loss of generality, t = k. Furthermore, in view of
Lemma C.4, let us assume that all agents have the same component ordering Q0 in both
PN and P¯N where Q
0 is given by 1Q0 . . .Q0k. We need to show ϕ(PN) = ϕ(P¯N). Assume
for contradiction ϕ(PN) 6= ϕ(P¯N). Since k is the worst component in P
0
i , by block
preservation property, this implies ϕ(x−k,yk)(PN) 6= ϕ(x−k,yk)(P¯N) for some (x
−k,yk).
Consider Pkj for some j 6= i. By our assumption on the marginal domains, there
is a swap-local path pik = (pik(1) = Pkj , . . . ,pi
k(t) = Pˆkj ) in D
k with Pˆkj (1) = P
k
i (1)
such that for any two consecutive preferences in the path there is a common upper
contour set U such that exactly one of yk and zk is contained in U . By Remark 9.1,
the path ((P0j ,P
1
j , . . . ,P
k−1
j ,pi
k(1)), . . . , (P0j ,P
1
j , . . . ,P
k−1
j ,pi
k(t))) satisfies the property
that for all l < t and all u,v ∈ Pi△P¯i there is a common upper contour set U of both
(P0j ,P
1
j , . . . ,P
k−1
j ,pi
k(l)) and (P0j ,P
1
j , . . . ,P
k−1
j ,pi
k(l + 1)) such that exactly one of u
and v is contained in U , and hence by Lemma C.1, we have ϕ(x−k,yk)(Pi, Pˆj,P−{i, j}) 6=
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ϕ(x−k,yk)(P¯i, Pˆj,P−{i, j}), where Pˆj = (P
0
j ,P
1
j , . . . ,P
k−1
j , Pˆ
k
j ). Continuing in this manner,
we can construct Pˆ−i ∈ S
n−1 such that for all j ∈ N \ i, Pˆkj (1) = P
k
i (1) and Pˆ
l
j =
Plj for all l 6= k, and ϕ(x−k,yk)(Pi, Pˆ−i) 6= ϕ(x−k,yk)(P¯i, Pˆ−i). Note that the preference
profiles (Pi, Pˆ−i) and (P¯i, Pˆ−i) are component-unanimous for component k, and hence by
Proposition 9.1, ϕk
Pki (1)
(Pi, Pˆ−i) = ϕ
k
Pki (1)
(P¯i, Pˆ−i) = 1. This implies ϕ(x−k,yk)(Pi, Pˆ−i) =
ϕ(x−k,yk)(P¯i, Pˆ−i) = 0, which contradicts ϕ(x−k,yk)(Pi, Pˆ−i) 6= ϕ(x−k,yk)(P¯i, Pˆ−i). 
C.12 PROOF OF THEOREM 9.1
Proof. By means of Proposition 9.2, it is enough to prove Theorem 9.1 for every
RSCF satisfying tops-onlyness and block preservation. Let ϕ : S n → ∆A be a tops-
only RSCF satisfying the block preservation property. We show that ϕ is marginally
decomposable. Let PN , P¯N ∈ S
n be such that PlN = P¯
l
N for some l ∈ K. Since ϕ is
tops-only we assume without loss of generality that the l-th component is top-ranked
according to the lexicographic ordering over the components in Pi and P¯i for all i ∈ N.
Consider an agent j ∈ N. Since component l is the lexicographic best component in
both Pj and P¯j, for each a
l ∈ Al , the set of alternatives B(al) = {(x−l ,al) | x−l ∈ A−l}
can be expressed as a union of blocks in (Pj, P¯j). Therefore, by applying the block
preservation property to each block in B(al), we obtain ϕB(al)(Pj,P− j) = ϕB(al)(P¯j,P− j)
for all al ∈ Al . Continuing in this manner, it follows that ϕB(al)(PN) = ϕB(al)(P¯N) for all
al ∈ Al . By the definition of marginal distribution, this means ϕ l(PN) = ϕ
l(P¯N) which
completes the proof. 
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